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ABSTRACT
The foundational justifications of Canada’s retributive criminal law contain several
assumptions about human nature. This folk psychology claims that rationality can be
used to override impulses and behave in compliance with the law. In sharp contrast,
Neuroscience has established that conscious thought processes are enmeshed with
the emotional responses of the unconscious limbic system. Furthermore, the
capacity to refrain from acting on its impulses and make particular choices is shaped
as we develop in the social environment and factors outside individual control.
The interdisciplinary discourse on this conflict between law and neuroscience has
unnecessarily implicated the free will debate and is further stagnated by epistemic
cultural differences between the two disciplines. To inquire beyond these roadblocks,
this thesis applies methodological principles of pragmatic philosophy. Rather than
asking which description of human nature is true, the pragmatic approach taken in
this thesis focuses on the difference either would make in practice.
This thesis concludes that criminal law should discard retributive folk psychology
because it functions in practice to confuse criminal law, veil the normative basis of
judgements, and frustrate rather than support the realization of Charter values, as
well as Canada’s commitment to reconciliation with Indigenous people. Punishment
practices justified by retributive folk psychology also function at cross purposes with
the objectives of criminal justice to cause more crime. In contrast, alternative criminal
justice practices, founded on norms that are compatible with neuroscience, perform
better.
Furthermore, the common argument that retributive moral theory is necessary to
justify protective individual rights is also be dismissed. Neuroscience, coupled with
compatible norms developed in alternative legal theory, provide a foundation for the
construction of rights that would better protect dignity and autonomy and guide the
development of new practices which would function to support the achievement of its
purposes, in harmony with Charter values.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
[I]t may be said that this concept of equal assessment of every
actor, regardless of his particular motives or the particular
pressures operating upon his will, is so fundamental to the
criminal law as rarely to receive explicit articulation. However, the
entire premise expressed by such thinkers as Kant and Hegel
that man is by nature a rational being, and that this rationality
finds expression both in the human capacity to overcome the
impulses of one's own will and in the universal right to be free
from the imposition of the impulses and will of others … supports
the view that an individualized assessment of offensive conduct
is simply not possible. If the obligation to refrain from criminal
behaviour is perceived as a reflection of the fundamental duty to
be rationally cognizant of the equal freedom of all individuals,
then the focus of analysis of culpability must be on the act itself
(including its physical and mental elements) and not on the
actor.1
This statement from Justice Wilson’s dissent in Perka, affirmed in Creighton,
discloses that particular ideas about human nature and our capacity for rationality
are fundamental to criminal law.2 As she tells us, these ideas can be traced to longdead philosophers who developed theoretical concepts foundational to the law’s
understanding of individual obligations and rights vis-a-vis the state and each other.
Kant and Hegel also developed moral theories of retribution or the idea that when we
choose to do wrong we deserve to suffer the punishment.3

Kant and Hegel were idealists who thought that the world as perceived through the
senses was an illusion, but that reason could be used to arrive at absolute moral

1

R v Perka, [1984] 2 SCR 232 at 273, [1984] SCJ No 40.

2

R v Creighton, [1993] 3 SCR 3 at 122, [1993] SCJ No 91.

3

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans John Ladd, (Indianapolis & New
York: Bobbs- Merril, 1965); and GWF Hegel in TM Knox trans, Philosophy of Right, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press,1967). See for discussion: Simon Young, “Kant's Theory of Punishment
in a Canadian Setting” (1996) 22 Queen's L J 347; and Markus Dirk Dubber, “Rediscovering
Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment” (1992) 92:6 Mich L Rev 1577.
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truths.4 They believed their metaphysical moral theories corresponded with a
foundational reality that transcended intersubjectivity and what could be perceived
by the senses. 5 However, it does not appear that the law relies on their concepts
because it presumes their ideas transcended the limitations of a localized human
perspective. Canadian law does not mirror the original philosophies of Kant or
Hegel.6 Nor are they considered authorities on all contemporary moral issues.7
Furthermore, retributive norms preceded both philosophers and can be traced back
to Christian morality.8 Kant and Hegel did not invent criminal punishment, they wrote

4

See: Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Idealism" Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019), online:<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/
entries /idealism/>.
5

Ibid. There were differences between Kant and Hegel’s epistemology. Hegel was a traditional
German idealist while Kant’s orientation is referred to as ‘transcendental idealism’. Kant describes
Hegel’s form of idealism as grounded in the belief that, “all cognition through the senses and
experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in the ideas of pure understanding
and reason” in contrast to his own belief that “[a]ll cognition of things out of mere pure
understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in experience”
in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans Paul Carus, 3rd ed (Chicago: Open Court
Publishing,1902) at 190.
6

We do not have the death penalty in Canada but Kant believed the death penalty the
appropriate punishment for homicide. See: JC Merle, “A Kantian Critique of Kant’s Theory of
Punishment” (2000) 19:1 Law & Phil 311. Furthermore its not even clear that Kant intended his
moral theories as a justification for state punishment. See: Mark Tunick, “Is Kant a
Retributivist?” (1996) Hist Pol Thought 17 at 60-78; and J Angelo Corlett, “Making Sense of
Retributivism” (2001) 76:295 Philosophy 77 at 87.
7

In addition to being a proponent of the death penalty Kant was a racist. He wrote that “humanity
exists in its greatest perfection in the white race...The yellow Indians have a smaller amount of
talent...The Negroes are lower and the lowest are a part of the American peoples” in Immanuel
Kant, "On the Different Races of Man" (1775) Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze ed, Race and
Enlightenment: A Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).
8

Albert Levitt, “Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea” (1922) 17 Ill L Rev 117, at 128. See also:
Freidrich Nietzsche in RJ Hollingdale trans, Beyond Good and Evil, (London: Penguin, 1973).
Nietzsche also viewed philosophical ideas about free will and morality as hang overs from
Christianity. At page 51 he states: “For the desire for ‘freedom of will’ in that metaphysical
superlative sense which is unfortunately still dominant in the minds of the half-educated, the
desire to bear the whole and sole responsibility for one’s actions and to absolve God, world,
ancestors, chance, society from responsibility for them, is nothing less than the desire to be
precisely that causa sui and… pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by
one’s own hair”.
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secular moral theory that justified state punishment within a liberal democracy. Their
ideas are not foundational to law or liberalism because it is believed they seized on
absolute and timeless truths. Rather, Kant and Hegel’s theories about human nature
and morality are embedded in the foundations of our law as received norms that
have informed the doctrines and practices of justice in liberal democratic societies as
they have developed together over many years. As Justice Wilson suggests these
norms have become so foundational that they are rarely expressed, let alone
unpacked for examination.

The package of assumptions about human nature embedded in the normative
foundations of law has been referred to as folk psychology.9 As will be discussed in
chapter two, the folk psychology underlying Canadian criminal law contains many
assumptions about human nature and our behavioural capacity which serve to justify
the attribution of moral blame and the imposition of suffering through punishment. As
Justice Wilson’s statement implies, the law considers us rational beings with the
ability to use rationality to control impulses and freely choose our conduct. Our
rationality makes us equal in ways that render individual circumstances or limitations
irrelevant in criminal law. Because we are rational, we are morally responsible for our
actions, hence culpable for our crimes and deserving of punishment. As will also be
discussed in chapter two, normative assumptions about the relationship between
rationality and behaviour have also informed the interpretation of Charter rights in
the criminal law context.10

9

For a discussion of folk psychology in law see: Robert Birmingham, “Folk Psychology and
Legal Understanding” (2000) 32 Conn L Rev 1715.
10

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.=
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Recently, empirical evidence has emerged from neuroscience that paints a radically
different picture of human nature than that described by retributive folk psychology.
As will be discussed in chapter three, neuroscience experiments have repeatedly
produced results that suggest decisions are initiated in unconscious brain processes
before we become conscious of our intentions. Despite initial resistance amongst
neuroscientists, it is now well established that the region associated with conscious
rational thought is enmeshed with the unconscious processes of the older limbic
system in the brain. Furthermore, research has consistently demonstrated that
developmental conditions and experiences in the social environment shape our
neurological capacity to have particular thoughts and make particular behavioural
choices. In short, neuroscience tells us that our capacity to behave in accordance
with what we reason to be right and wrong, or in our interests for that matter, is
determined by factors outside of our conscious control - not rationality.

As will also be discussed in chapter three, the apparent conflict between
neuroscience and retributive folk psychology has sparked calls for reform and
debate. However, in a manner consistent with the epistemic cultural differences of
law and science, this debate is marked by impasse and lack of meaningful dialogue.
Those who argue for reform based on neuroscience (“neuro-reformers”) emphasize
how its findings conflict with a belief in free will and that because retributive folk
psychology is based on dubious metaphysical concepts, law reform is necessary. In
response to these claims, it has been argued that resolving conflicts between law’s
folk psychology and neuroscience is not simply an empirical issue. Even if neuroreformers are correct in their claims, concepts of autonomy and responsibility that
have been derived from retributive folk psychology provide the normative justification
of individual rights and protections from state interference. If we discard retributive
folk psychology, we risk losing legal protections of freedom and autonomy. Neuro-

!4

reformers do not engage with these challenges and rest their arguments on
empirical validity. Furthermore, it has been suggested that utilitarian or
consequentialist justificatory frameworks, which do not provide for individual rights or
prevent over-punishment, should replace retributive norms in criminal law.

In chapter four, I put forward the pragmatic method as an appropriate way to
consider the issue and move past the epistemological conflict between law and
neuroscience. As will be discussed, pragmatism acknowledges that empirical
science has relevance to normative or moral questions but ultimately does not
resolve them. Based on principles derived from pragmatist writing, I argue that
consideration of whether or not retributive folk psychology should be abandoned,
and criminal law should integrate neuroscience into its norms, depends on the
difference it would make in practice. Hinging the issue on metaphysical debates such
as free will versus determinism is both unproductive and besides the point. What
matters is which description of human behaviour can better support criminal justice
practices that function to serve the broader purposes of criminal law and overarching
values of our legal system.

In chapter five, I apply pragmatic analysis to examine how retributive folk psychology
functions in practice. Alternative criminal justice practices that do not purport to
punish moral blame are also discussed. Based on this analysis I argue that
retributive folk psychology is wrong, not because of empirical invalidity, but because
it causes problems in practice. As will be discussed, retributive folk psychology
causes doctrinal problems, imposes suffering on the most vulnerable and
marginalized members of society, causes more crime not less, and functions to
frustrate the realization of Charter values.11 Contemporary Canadian punishment

11

See: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at para 41.
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practices also conflict our commitment to human rights and reconciliation with
Indigenous peoples. Regarding all of these concerns, alternative practices which are
informed by norms consistent with neuroscience function better. For these reasons, I
argue that neuroscience should, in part, inform criminal justice reform and the
development of new legal norms.

Chapter six discusses selected alternative normative theories that are compatible
with a neuroscientific understanding of human behaviour. It also responds to the
concern that retributive folk psychology is necessary to maintain normative concepts
of responsibility and autonomy along individual rights derived from them. As will be
discussed, neuroscience leads us to the conclusion that responsibility for crime is
shared, not individual. This conclusion is also compatible with the concept of
autonomy offered by relational theory. From this theoretical framework, individual
rights and state duties can be derived in a manner that provides more, not less
protection of freedom and autonomy. In addition, restorative justice theory provides
an alternative way to think about the goals of criminal justice, which is also
harmonious with a neuroscientific understanding of human behaviour and crime.
These alternative legal norms not only accord with neuroscience, but would also
better serve greater respect for human dignity and autonomy in the law.

The conclusion in chapter seven emphasizes that the theories and concepts put
forward in chapter six should not be taken as ‘true’ in any transcendent way. Thinking
about law pragmatically necessitates maintaining this awareness. The validity of
legal norms can only be derived by how they function in practice to support liberal
democracy. To evolve within a pluralistic society, legal theorists and judges must
remain cognizant that its concepts are contingent means to progressively realize the
law’s institutional purpose and values. Nonetheless, neuroscience coupled with

!6

normative language provides an understanding of human behaviour capable of
guiding the development of doctrine and criminal justice practices that would function
to better serve its purposes and overarching values. It also enables the discourse of
law to reconstruct its language in ways that can support the growth of human
solidarity necessary to extend to criminal offenders, the respect for dignity enshrined
in the Charter. Chapter seven also summarizes the primary contributions of this
thesis to legal scholarship and puts forward recommendations for future work.

!7

CHAPTER II
RETRIBUTIVE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW

This chapter identifies the retributive folk psychology in Canadian criminal law and
how it functions to justify punishment. As will be discussed, although punishment is
not mentioned in the Criminal Code, jurisprudence has established that retribution is
the overarching unifying purpose of criminal law and therefor punishment for moral
blame is the fundamental purpose of sentencing.

i) Choice & Moral Blame
The principle that conduct cannot be justly punished unless it was committed with a
blameworthy state of mind is foundational in Canadian criminal law. 12 The necessary
blameworthy state of mind is defined by the mens rea element of an offence. The
Leary decision explains:
The notion that a court should not find a person guilty of an
offence against the criminal law unless he has a blameworthy
state of mind is common to all civilized penal systems. It is
founded upon respect for the person and for the freedom of
human will. A person is accountable for what he wills. When, in
the exercise of the power of free choice, a member of society
chooses to engage in harmful or otherwise undesirable conduct
proscribed by the criminal law, he must accept the sanctions… to
be criminal, the wrongdoing must have been consciously
committed.13

12

See for example: R v Rees, [1956] SCR 640, 24 CR 1,115 CCC 1; Beaver v The Queen,
[1957] SCR 531, 26 CR 193; and R v King, [1962] SCR 746, 133 CCC 1.
13

Leary v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 29 at 34 [emphasis added].
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This reasoning served to inform interpretations of the scope of protection of life,
liberty and security of the person provided by section 7 of the Charter. 14 Reference
re Motor Vehicles Act established that “punishment of the morally innocent” violated
the principles of fundamental justice and therefore section 7. 15 Imprisonment for
absolute liability offences, for which no mens rea element is required, was held
unconstitutional.16

Because punishment is not justified without moral blame, section 7 also prohibits
punishment of people who commit crimes in a morally involuntary way.17 Criminal
conduct must be both physically and morally voluntary for guilt to be found. As King
states, “there can be no acts reus unless it is the result of a willing mind at liberty to
make a definite choice or decision, or in other words, there must be a willpower to do
an act.”18 The decision in Bouchard-Lebrun articulates many normative assumptions
regarding how humans use rationality to control their conduct. Justice Lebel states:
An individual's will is expressed through conscious control exerted by
the individual over his or her body... The control may be physical, in
which case voluntariness relates to the muscle movements of a
person exerting physical control over his or her body. The exercise of
a person's will may also involve moral control over actions the person
wants to take, in which case a voluntary act is a carefully thought out

14

Reference re s 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 SCR 486 at para 69,
[1985] SCJ No 73, states: “It has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the
innocent not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as an essential element of a
system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of
the human person and on the rule of law”.
15

Ibid at paras 81 and 121; and Charter, supra note 10 at s 7.

16

Ibid, Reference re s 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) at para 73 and 80, citing R v
Sault Saint Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299, [1978] SCJ No 59.
17

R v Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24.

18

King, supra note 12 at 749.
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act that is performed freely by an individual with at least a minimum
level of intelligence.19

The decision goes on to emphasize that our capacity for rationality is what enables
us to exercise moral control over our “will”:
Will is also a product of reason. The moral dimension of the voluntary
act, … reflects the idea that the criminal law views individuals as
autonomous and rational beings …human behaviour will trigger
criminal responsibility only if it results from a "true choice" or from the
person's "free will". This principle signals the importance of autonomy
and reason in the system of criminal responsibility.20

Bouchard-Lebrun also explains that because individuals with the capacity for
rationality are presumed to know the difference between right and wrong, they are
also assumed to be able to use it to control their actions in accordance with those
judgements. This is why individuals are deemed morally culpable for their conduct:
This essential basis for attributing criminal responsibility thus gives rise
to a presumption that each individual can distinguish right from wrong.
The criminal law relies on a presumption that every person is an
autonomous and rational being whose acts and omissions can attract
liability.21

Individuals with the capacity for rationality, are also assumed to be able to control
their thoughts in a way that makes them morally blameworthy when they
unintentionally cause harm. For negligence-based offences the presence of

19

R v Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58 at para 47. [emphasis added]

20

Ibid at 47, citing Perka, supra note 1.

21

Ibid at 49.
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conscious intention is not necessary to establish guilt. 22 Creighton established that
the failure to exercise conscious thought or intention can, in itself, establish moral
blameworthiness.23 The reasoning in that decision cited HLA Hart.24 Hart states:
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when
they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what
the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair
opportunity to exercise these capacities. Where these capacities and
opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied
cases of accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity,
etc, the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because “he
could not have helped it” or “he could not have done otherwise” or “he
had no real choice”. But as we have seen there is no reason (unless
we are to reject the whole business of responsibility and punishment)
always to make this protest when someone who ‘just didn’t think’ is
punished for carelessness. For in some cases at least we may say ‘he
could have thought about what he was doing’ with just as much
rational confidence as one can say of any intentional wrong doing ‘he
could have done otherwise.25

Moral blameworthiness deserving of punishment can thus be imputed from the
failure to think and choose rightly when one has “normal capacities” to do so if their
conduct is deemed a “marked departure” from the “reasonable person” standard.26
The so-called “normal capacities” have been described by Hart as not simply a “legal
22

Subjective mens rea requires determining the real presence of a particular state in the
conscious mind of accused and what they actually knew, intended, or considered as opposed to
what they should have or could have been expected to know in comparison to an objective
standard. See: R v H(AD), 2013 SCC 28 at 3.
23 Creighton,

24

supra note 2.

Ibid at 120.

25

HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at 152 [emphasis
added].
26

Creighton, supra note 2 at 144. See also R v Roy, 2012 SCC 26 at at para 16: “a subjective
standard means, in the context of an offence under s 218 of the Code, that the fault element
requires proof at least of recklessness, in other words that the accused persisted in a course of
conduct knowing of the risk which it created. Subjective fault, of course, may also refer to other
states of mind. It includes intention to bring about certain consequences; actual knowledge that
the consequences will occur; or wilful blindness — that is, knowledge of the need to inquire as to
the consequences and deliberate failure to do so.”
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status” but referring to “certain complex psychological characteristics of person,”
consisting of “understanding, reasoning, and control of conduct: the ability to
understand what conduct legal rules or morality require, to deliberate and reach
decisions concerning these requirements, and to conform to decisions when
made”.27 Creighton held that these capacities could be assumed to be present.28 As
Justice McLachlin explains, Canadian criminal law rejects “experiential, educational
and psychological defences falling short of incapacity”.29

Pursuant to the Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (“NCMD”)
doctrine, the normal capacities are deemed present in individuals unless they suffer
from a mental disorder rendering them “incapable of appreciating the nature and
quality” of their criminal conduct.30 Justice Dickson explains that this determination
turns on whether the offender has the capacity to use rationality to make decisions
about right and wrong:
One looks at capacity to reason and to reach rational decisions as to
whether the act is morally wrong. If wrong simply means "illegal" this
virtually forecloses any inquiry as to capacity. The question for the jury
is whether mental illness so obstructed the thought processes of the

27

Hart, supra note 25 at 218 and 227- 228.

28

Creighton, supra note 2 at 124.

29

Ibid at 128. This is the general principle, but the distinction is blurred in the application of
defence doctrines. See for example: Ruzic, supra note 17. As will be discussed more in this
thesis, although the analysis in that case focused on circumstances, it implicitly acknowledges
how these factors altered her decision making process. See also: R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR
852, [1990] SCJ No 36. In that case psychological characteristics short of incapacity were
considered. Furthermore, the reasonable person standard is not static but is defined by the role
or capacity the accused was acting in. For example, see: R v Javanmardi, 2019 SCC 54. In that
case, to determine whether a naturopathic doctor was criminally negligent in giving a particular
treatment, the inquiry assessed whether the skills, training, and knowledge of a naturopathic
doctor were reasonably applied.
30

Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 16.
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accused as to make him incapable of knowing that his acts were
morally wrong.31

In summary, retributive folk psychology assumes that the human capacity for
rationality can be used to control behavioural choices, override impulses, and think
particular thoughts to avoid acting in ways that place others at risk for harm.
Possessing a ‘normal’ capacity for rationality is also assumed to make us all equally
capable of using it in these ways to comply with the law. Based on these
assumptions when an individual commits a crime they are deemed blameworthy and
deserving of punishment. These normative assumptions have also been embedded
in the interpretation of individual rights under the Charter. As will be discussed in the
next section, retributive folk psychology is so foundational in Canadian criminal law,
it has also influenced the interpretation of sentencing provisions of the Code in ways
that arguably conflict with legislative intent.

ii) Sentencing in the Criminal Code
If one were to look solely at legislation, the retributive nature of our criminal law
could not be ascertained. The Corrections and Conditional Release Act states as its
purpose the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into their
communities.32 Section 718 of the Criminal Code states that the “fundamental
purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime
prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful
and safe society” imposing “just sanctions” to achieve one or more listed
objectives.33 Traditional sentencing goals, such as denunciation, deterrence,
31

R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303 at 91, [1990] SCJ No 139, citing Justice Dickson’s dissent in R
v Schwartz, [1977] 1 SCR 673 at 675.
32

Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20, s 3 (b).

33

Criminal Code, supra note 30, at s 718.
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separation of offenders from society, and rehabilitation, are listed in subsections (a)
through (d). Subsections (e) and (f) list objectives derived from restorative justice
theory.34 Section 718 does not include punishing moral blame as a purpose or in its
list of sentencing objectives.

The present sentencing provisions in Criminal Code were added by amendments
enacted by Bill C-41.35 The product of decades of consultation and review, Bill C-41
was intended to target long-standing problems of high incarceration and recidivism,
disparity in sentencing, as well as indigenous over–representation in the system.36
More generally the sentencing reforms sought to move away from retributive
normativity to an approach consistent with the modern understanding of crime as a
complex social problem.37 It introduced provisions authorizing non-custodial
conditional sentences and diversion to alternative measures such as restorative

34

Section 718 (d) states: “[t]o provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community”.
Section 718 (e) states: “to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of
the harm done to victims or to the community”. Ibid. Parliaments adoption of these concepts was
an intentional departure from retributive punishment. See also: Canada, Parliament, House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility: Report of
the Standing Committee on its Review of Sentencing, Conditional Release and Related Aspects
of Corrections, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, No 65 (16 August 1988 and 17 August 1877) (Chair: David
Daubney, MP) at 46-47.
35

Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and Other Acts in Consequence
Thereof, SC 1995, c 22.
36

Canada, The Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987) (Chair: Archambault, O) at 40-44 and 49-85; and
Daubney, supra note 34 at 211-217 and 236-240.
37

See: Archambault, Ibid, at xxviii, and 36- 40; and Daubney, supra note 34 at 46- 52. The shift
away from retributive intent in Canadian sentencing was earlier stated in Canadian Committee on
Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections, Information Canada, Ottawa,
(March, 1969) (Chair: Roger Ouimet). Ibid at page 194 states: “The primary purpose of
sentencing is the protection of society. Deterrence, both general and particular, through
knowledge of penalties consequent upon prohibited acts; rehabilitation of the individual offender
into a law-abiding citizen; confinement of the dangerous offender as long as he [or she] is
dangerous, are major means of accomplishing this purpose. Use of these means should,
however, be devoid of any connotation of vengeance or retribution.” [emphasis added].
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justice.38 Provisions intended to restrain use of imprisonment were also included.
Subsection 718.2 (d) states that less restrictive sanctions should be considered
before imprisonment, and 718.2 (e) includes a direction to consider “all available
sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances”, with
“particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders”. 39

To target discrepancy and unpredictability in sentencing, under the heading
“fundamental principle,” section 718.2 directs that a “sentence must be
proportionate to the gravity of the oﬀence and the degree of responsibility of the
oﬀender”.40 Based on the discussion within the reports of the Sentencing
Commission and the parliamentary standing committee tasked with review of
sentencing reform (“Daubney Report”), it does not appear this was intended to
import an additional statement of normative purpose into the Criminal Code.41
Legislative intent notwithstanding, reference to the principle of proportionality in
section 718.2 was the basis upon which retribution or punishing moral blame was

38

Criminal Code, supra note 30 at ss 717 (alternative measures) 718 -718.2 (purpose and
principles), and 742 (conditional sentence), and 743 (imprisonment and parole).
39

Ibid at s 718.2 (e). For a breakdown and analysis of the amendments see: Julian V Roberts &
Andrew von Hirsch “Statutory Sentencing Reform: The Purpose and Principles of Sentencing”,
1995 37 CLW 220.
40

Criminal Code, supra note 30.

41

See: Archambault, supra note 36 at 129 - 131 and 143. At page 131 the report quotes from
Andrew von Hirsch in “Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluating Formal Sentencing
Structures and Their Rationale” (1983) 74 J Crim L & Criminol 209 at 211 which states: “The
principle of commensurate- deserts addresses the question of allocation of punishments — that
is, how much to punish convicted offenders. This allocation question is distinct from the issue of
the general justification of punishment — namely, why the legal institution of punishment should
exist at all (our emphasis)”. See also Daubney, supra 34 at 46.
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maintained as the fundamental purpose and consideration in sentencing
determinations under Canadian law.42

iii) Punishing Moral Blame
Despite the apparent intent of Bill C-41, retributive punishment was maintained as an
overarching purpose of sentencing through judicial interpretation of its amendments.
The amendments were not in force when the case of M(CA) was determined, but the
decision turned on the proper purpose and application of the then common law
principles of proportionality and totality in sentencing determinations. 43 The
reasoning with respect to retribution and proportionality was later applied in Proulx,
which turned on the interpretation of the Bill C-41 amendments. 44 Read side by side,
these cases demonstrate how the emphasis on moral blame and punishment in the
jurisprudence prevailed after the Bill C-41 amendments despite the normative shift
away from punishment evident in the drafting language as well as the Sentencing
Commission and Daubney reports.

The facts of M(CA) are disturbing. Authorities discovered nine malnourished minors
living in deplorable conditions who had been abandoned a year earlier by their

42

As will be discussed more in the next section, the sentencing provisions of the code have been
interpreted to import report retributive values. See: Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Moving Towards a
Minimalist and Transformative Criminal Justice System: Essay on the Reform of the Objectives
and Principles of Sentencing, (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, Research and Statistics
Division, 2016), online: Department of Justice Canada, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/
pps-opdp/pps-opdp.pdf>. Ibid at page 18 states: “Even though they are not fundamentally
repressive from an ontological point of view,the sentencing objectives set out in paragraphs (a) to
(f) of section 718 and in sections 718.01 and 718.02 of the Criminal Code have been interpreted
as reflecting negative values of affliction and punishment.”
43

R v M(CA), [1996] 1 SCR 500, [1996] SCJ No 28.

44

R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5.
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father, the accused.45 The accused was 55 years old, had a diagnosed personality
disorder, was abused as a child himself, and expressed remorse for his crimes.46
The evidence established that in the three years prior to his departure he had
brutally and routinely physically, sexually, and emotionally abused his children.47 The
trial judge, expressing outrage at the egregiousness of the crimes and the conduct of
the accused, ordered a cumulative, 25 year sentence.48 The British Columbia Court
of Appeal (“BCCA”), following a well-established appellate line of authority limiting
cumulative sentencing to twenty years, reduced the sentence to 18 years and 8
months.49 The crown appealed on grounds that the BCCA erred in applying a cap on
cumulative sentences, and in holding that retribution was not a legitimate purpose of
sentencing.50

Justice Lamer, writing for the court, held that the BCCA erred in applying the cap
stating that only clear legislative direction could constrain judicial discretion with a
strict limit on cumulative sentences.51 Although not necessary to determine the
appeal, Justice Lamer went on to discuss the role of retributive principles in
sentencing determinations. 52 Stating a “profound belief” in retribution as an important
45

M(CA), supra note 43 at paras 1- 19.

46

Ibid at paras 5 and 15.

47

Ibid at paras 20 - 23.

48

R v M(CA), [1994] BCJ No 51at 7, 40 BCAC 7 (BCCA).

49

Ibid at paras 31- 37, 42- 44, and 68.

50

M(CA), supra note 43 at 32.

51

Ibid at paras 70 - 74.

52

Ibid at para 76.
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unifying principle in criminal law, he held that the assessment of moral
blameworthiness was not only valid but of paramount importance in sentencing.53 In
M(CA) Justice Lamer draws support for this conclusion from prior jurisprudence that
interpreted section 7 in the context of criminal liability doctrines :
it is a principle of "fundamental justice" under s. 7 of the Charter that
criminal liability may only be imposed if an accused possesses a
minimum "culpable mental state" in respect of the ingredients of the
alleged offence. … It is this mental state which gives rise to the "moral
blameworthiness" which justifies the state in imposing the stigma and
punishment associated with a criminal sentence…. it is this same
element of "moral blameworthiness" which animates the determination
of the appropriate quantum of punishment for a convicted offender as
a ‘just sanction.’54

To further support the conclusion that punishment for moral blame was the proper
focus of sentencing, Justice Lamer interpreted the principle of proportionality in a
manner that is arguably inconsistent with legislative intent. Scholarly opinion was
divided on whether or not the principle functioned to avoid both disproportionately
harsh and lenient sentences.55 Noval Morris viewed proportionality as rooted in
fairness, intended to prevent unjustly harsh punishment, and as having a limiting

53

Ibid at para 79.

54

Ibid at para 78 [emphasis added].

55

See: Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, “The Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in
Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning” (2007) 10:2 New Crim L Rev 278; and Allan Manson, “The
Appeal of Conditional Sentences of Imprisonment” (1997) 5:5 C R 279. There were other debates
surrounding the principle of proportionality prior to its codification in Canada. See for example:
Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 1: Harm to Others, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990); David Bazelon, “The Morality of the Criminal Law”, 1976) 49 S
Cal L Rev 385; and Richard Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on Equality and Desert,
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979) at ch 5.
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function only.56 Andrew von Hirsch agreed that the principal was rooted in fairness,
but disagreed with Morris’s conclusion that it functioned only as an upper limit.57
He describes proportionality as an ordinal principle that ensures predictability and
parity in sentencing and achieves proportionate sentences through comparative
analysis of sentences in similar cases.58 Applying proportionality only as a cardinal
principle would “presuppose a heroic kind of intuitionism: that if one only reflects
enough, one will “see” the deserved quanta of punishment for various crimes.”59
Furthermore, von Hirsch says proportionality analysis focuses on the seriousness of
the conduct, not the moral character of an offender. As he explains, proportionality
requires “a reasonable proportion…between overall levels of punitiveness and the
gravity of the criminal conduct”.60 The report of the Sentencing Commission, which
had engaged von Hirsch as an advisor, indicates that the principle was most likely
intended to function as he describes it.61
56

Noval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) at 73
and 78-80. See also for discussion: Richard S Frase, “Limiting retributivism: The Consensus
Model of Criminal Punishment.”, Michael Tonry, ed, The Future of Imprisonment in the 21rst
Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), online: Social Science Research Network,
<https://ssrn.com/ abstract=420324>.
57

Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment” (1992) 16 Crime and
Jusitice at 75- 76.
58

Ibid at 75- 85. The manner von Hirsch describes proportionality is cardinal, in the sense it is
based on the important general rule that the overall levels of punitiveness of a sentence must be
proportional to the gravity of the criminal conduct and also ordinal because it calls for the
sentencing judge to seek parity in a sentence compared to crimes of similar seriousness.
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Ibid at 76.

60

Ibid at 83.
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Archambault, supra note 37 at 142-144. However the report also emphasizes restraint, ibid at
page 30 states, “[s]ince the emphasis is on the accountability of the offender rather than on
punishment per se, a sentence should be the least onerous sanction appropriate.” See also: A
von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes:Deservedness & Dangerousness in the Sentencing of
Criminals (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,1985), at 40; and Julian V Roberts &
Andrew von Hirsch, “Conditional Sentences of Imprisonment and the Fundamental Principle of
Proportionality in Sentencing”, (1998) 10 CR (5) 222.
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The definition of proportionality upheld in M(CA) is starkly different from von Hirsch’s
conceptualization of the principle and presumes judges have the “heroic kind of
intuitionism” he is sceptical of.62 Justice Lamer states that “punishment must be
proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender” and “those who cause
harm intentionally [should] be punished more severely than those causing harm
unintentionally”. 63 To distinguish the legitimate retribution required by the principle of
proportionality from vengeance Justice Lamer states:
Retribution in a criminal context, by contrast, represents an objective,
reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment
which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having
regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential
harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the
offender's conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution
incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition
of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.64

After Bill C-41 was enacted Justice Lamer affirmed and expanded the reasoning in
M(CA) in the Proulx decision which directly implicated the interpretation of
subsections 718.2 (d) and (e) of the Code, as well as section 742.1 authorizing
conditional sentences for terms of imprisonment less than two years in length. 65 Mr.
Proulx was a newly licensed eighteen year old driver sentenced to eighteen months
in prison for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.66 The trial judge
acknowledged the offender did not require rehabilitation and served no risk to the
62

A von Hirsch, supra note 57.

63

M(CA), supra note 43 at 40, citing R v M(JJ), [1993] 2 SCR 421, at 431 and R v Martineau,
[1990] 2 SCR 633, at 645.
64

R v (M(CA), ibid at para 8 [emphasis added].

65

Proulx, supra note 44, and Criminal Code, supra note 30.
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Proulx, ibid at paras 3 - 9.
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community but determined that a conditional sentence would not appropriately
achieve the purposes of denunciation and general deterrence.67 The Manitoba Court
of Appeal substituted a conditional sentence on the grounds that the trial judge erred
in attaching undue weight to denunciation when considering the appropriateness of a
conditional sentence.68

The decision in Proulx granted the Crown’s appeal and held that the legislature did
not intend to constrain the judicial discretion by creating a presumption in favor of
non-custodial conditional sentences or precluding terms of imprisonment under two
years. To support this conclusion, the decision reasoned that application of the
principle of proportionality in section 718.2 granted sentencing judges with wide
discretion to assess the moral blameworthiness of offenders, and that a presumption
in favour of conditional sentences would unduly restrain its intended scope and
function.69

Subsequent decisions have continued to uphold moral blameworthiness as the
primary consideration in proportionality and parity as a “secondary concern”.70
Accordingly, proportionality has been interpreted in a manner that conflicts with the
legislative intent of Bill C-45 and the goal of achieving better parity and predictability
in sentencing. Instead, it has been interpreted in M(CA) and Proulx as a cardinal
principle intended to provide sentencing judges wide discretion to assess “moral
blameworthiness”.

67

Ibid at para 5.

68

Ibid at at para 7.

69

Ibid at paras 82 - 83 and 116.

70

R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 12.
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Furthermore, the court has elevated its interpretation of proportionality to
constitutional status. In Ipeelee, it is stated that proportionality in sentencing “could
aptly be described as a principle of fundamental justice” pursuant to section 7 of the
Charter.71 This suggests that proportionality functions to protect an offenders rights,
but generally the principle is applied to justify harsher sentences.72 As Marie-Eve
Sylvestre notes, proportionality “generally implies an obligation and a duty to punish
in the first place as well as the idea that the punishment must be sufficiently afflictive
in order to be just and appropriate”. 73

In conclusion, retributive folk psychology and its implicit norms regarding rationality
have shaped criminal legal doctrine and guided both the interpretation of section 7 of
the Charter and legislated sentencing reform. Retributive folk psychology functions
as a foundation of assumed truths about human nature from which the law
concludes that when an individual commits a crime they deserve to suffer
punishment. Principles constructed from or interpreted based on retributive folk
psychology such as “moral involuntariness” and proportionality have been
embedded into interpretation of the scope of protection provided by section 7 in the
criminal law context. Thus, retributive folk psychology and its assumptions about our

71

R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para 36.

72

See for example: R v Fice, 2005 SCC 32; and Lacasse, supra note 70. As will be further
discussed in chapter five, in Ipeelee, supra note 71, the principle was exceptionally applied to
reduce the sentences of two indigenous offenders who, due to background and systemic
factors ,were held to have reduced moral culpability.
73

Marie-Eve Sylvestre, “The (Re)Discovery of the Proportionality Principle in Sentencing in
Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of Collective Responsibility” (2013) 63:2 SCLR
461 at 14 (QL).
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capacity to use rationality to exert “moral control” over our behaviour are
foundational to criminal law in Canada. 74

74

Bouchard- Lebrun, supra note 19.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
NEUROSCIENCE AND RETRIBUTIVE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY

In recent decades, the rapid progress of neuroscience has attracted significant
media attention and prompted discussion in legal scholarship concerning a variety of
issues.75 The picture of human nature that has emerged from neuroscience has also
sparked discussion and debate regarding retributive folk psychology.76 This chapter
will review the arguments in that discussion, the neuroscience at issue, and discuss
the epistemic cultural differences between law and neuroscience that have
prevented the debate from moving beyond impasse into meaningful interdisciplinary
dialogue.

75

See for example: David Disalvo, “Can Neuroscience Debunk Free Will?”, Time (2014), online:
<https://time.com/3529770/neuroscience-free-will/>; Cliodhna O'Connor et al,“Neuroscience in
the Public Sphere”, (2012) 74:2 Neuron 220; Jennifer A Chandler, “The Use of Neuroscientific
Evidence in Canadian Criminal Proceedings” (2015) 2:3 J L & Biosci, 550; Jennifer A Chandler
“Health Law The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame, and Social
Solidarity” (2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 831 (QL); Morris B Hoffman, “Nine Neuro-law Predictions”,
(2018) 21 New Crim L Rev 212; Betsy J Grey, “Implications of Neuroscience Advances in Rort
Law: a General Overview” (2015) 12 Ind H L Rev 671; Stacey A Tovino, “Will Neuroscience
Redefine Mental Injury? Disability Benefit Law, Mental Health Parity Law, and Disability
Discrimination Law”, (2015) 12 Ind H L Rev 695; Sydney B Roth, “The Emergence of
Neuroscience Evidence in Louisiana” (2012) 87 Tul L Rev 197; Arielle R Baskin-Sommers &
Karelle Fonteneau, “Correctional Change Through Neuroscience”, (2016) 85 Fordham L Rev 42;
John B Meixner Jr, “Neuroscience and Mental Competency: Current Uses and Future Potential”,
(2018) 81 Alb L Rev 995; and Oliver R Goodenough and Micaela Tucker , “Law and cognitive
neuroscience” (2010) 6 Ann Rev L Soc Sci 61.
For a review of the development and progress of interdisciplinary research in law and
neuroscience see: Francis X Shen, “The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the
Emerging Field of Neurolaw” (2010) 38 Int'l J Legal Info 352.
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See for example: Stephen J Morse, “Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils
and Promise of Neuroscience” (2015) 99 Marq L Rev 39; Elizabeth Bennett, “Neuroscience and
Criminal Law: Have We Been Getting it Wrong for Centuries and Where Do We Go From
Here?” (2016) 85 Fordham L Rev 437; Nicole A Vincent, “On the Relevance of Neuroscience to
Criminal responsibility” (2010) 4 Crim L & Phil 77; and Deborah W Denno, “Neuroscience and the
Personalization of Criminal Law” (2019) 86 U Chicago L Rev 359.
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i) The ‘Neuroscience of Free Will’
Benjamin Libet’s research is commonly referred to as the “neuroscience of free
will”.77 His initial experimental design involved electroencephalogram (“EEG”)
measurement of brain activity as research subjects were asked to choose when to
flex their wrists and record the time at which they arrived at their intention. Even
when accounting for margin of error in subject reporting, the results demonstrated
that the readiness potential that occurs when flexion is signalled occurred before
subjects became conscious of their intention to flex.78

More recent studies utilizing Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) also report
results indicating that behavioural choices are determined before the chooser
becomes conscious of their choice,79 even in studies involving abstract choices.80
Observing MRI images of neurological activity, researchers have been able to
accurately predict subject’s choices before they are able to consciously identify it.81
77

See for example: WP Banks, & S Pockett, “Benjamin Libet's Work on the Neuroscience of Free
Will” in Velmans & S Schneider eds,The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, (Hoboken:
Blackwell Science, 2007), at 657.
78

Benjamin Libet, Curtis A Gleason, Elwood W Wright and Dennis K Pearl, “Time of Conscious
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness- Potential): The Unconscious
Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act” (1985) 106 Brain 623; and Benjamin Libet, “Unconscious
Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action” (1985) 8:4 Behavioural and
Brain Sci 529.
79

JD Haynes, “Decoding and Predicting Intentions” (2011) 1224:1 Ann NY Acad Sci 9; I Fried, R
Mukamel & G Kreiman, "Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial
Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition” (2011) 69:3 Neuron 548; Chun Siong Soon, et al, “Unconscious
Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain” (2008) 11:5 Nature 543; and Masao
Matsuhashi & Mark Hallett, "The Timing of the Conscious Intention to Move” (2008)11 Eur J
Neurosc 28.
80

Chun Siong Soon et al, "Predicting Free Choices for Abstract Intentions", (2013) 110:15, Proc
Natl Acad Sci 6217.
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See for example: Stefan Bode et al, “Tracking the Unconscious Generation of Free Decisions
Using Ultra-High Field fMRI” (2011) 6:6 PLOS One 1; and John-Dylan Haynes et al, “Reading
Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain” (2007) 17 Curr Biol 323.
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One study predicted the choices of subjects undertaking a “thought-based mental
imagery decision task” eleven seconds before they became conscious of their
intention.82

Based on results of this kind, it has been argued that neuroscience has proven that
free will does not exist and the universe is deterministic. 83 However, interpreting
these experiments as offering conclusive evidence refuting the existence of free will
is controversial. Both the validity of the data and the methodology of Libet’s
experimental design have been questioned.84 Similar studies have resulted in
conflicting data and interpretations.85 Doubts have also been voiced regarding the
simple motor-based binary choices involved in Libet’s experiments and whether they
are replicable in more complex cognitive decision making. 86 Libet himself had
difficulty accepting his findings, and maintained the belief that conscious thought
processes could still determine choice, at the very least through veto decisions to
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Roger Koenig-Robert & Joel Pearson, “Decoding the Contents and Strength of Imagery Before
Volitional Engagement” (2019) 9 Scientific Reports 3504.
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See for example: Sam Harris, Free Will, (New York: Free Press, 2012).
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Neuroscie 29; and Aaron Schurger, et al, “An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity
Prior to Self-initiated Movement” (2012) 109:42 Proc Nat Acad Sci USA E2094.
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See for example: Judy Trevena & Jeff Miller, "Brain Preparation Before a Voluntary Action:
Evidence Against Unconscious Movement Initiation" (2010) 19:1 Conscious & Cogn 447; and
Aaron Schurger, et al, “Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Movement: A New
Perspective” (2016) 20 Trends Cogn Sci 20 77.
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stop initiated choices (free won’t).87 Subsequent research has demonstrated that
choices can be vetoed after the readiness potential is initiated, but have not
conclusively identified the precise neurological processes and brain structures
involved in veto decisions or whether these decisions are also initiated in
unconscious processes.88

Whatever the findings might imply, it is important to remember that free will is a
metaphysical concept that has been defined in different ways.89 Determinism is also
still debatable in science. The classical Newtonian world view in physics that
supported the deterministic conclusion was disrupted in the early 20th century by
quantum mechanics. 90 Empirical study at the quantum level repeatedly
demonstrates unpredictability, indeterminacy and a probabilistic rather than
deterministic world view.91 John Searle has offered a novel definition of free will that
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Benjamin Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2004), at 123. See also for discussion: Andrea Lavazza, “Free Will and
Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring
It” (2016) 10 Front Hum Neurosci 262.
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"Retrospective Construction of the Judgement of Free Choice" (2009) 18:1 Conscious & Cogn 12;
and Marcel Brass & Patrick Haggard, “To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of SelfControl” (2007) 27:34 J Neurosci 9141.
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See for examples: Timothy O'Connor & Chistopher Franklin, "Free Will” in Edward N Zalta, ed,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), online: Stanford Encyclopedia of
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harmonizes neuroscience with quantum indeterminacy. 92 He maintains that the
question of free will remains open:
The problem of free will is unusual among contemporary
philosophical issues in that we are nowhere remotely near to
having a solution. I can give you a pretty good account of
consciousness, intentionality, speech acts and of the ontology of
society but I do not know how to solve the problem of free will.93

ii) Sapolsky’s Synthesis
Regardless of whether it establishes or disproves anything conclusive regarding free
will and determinism, the neuroscience of free will is consistent with findings in other
areas of neuro-behavioural research. Cognitive research produces results consistent
with the conclusion that conscious rational thought processes do not control, or have
an independent determinative role in, behavioural choices. 94 Meta-analysis of thirty
five years of research studying the role of emotions in decisions indicates that
emotional responses, even when acknowledged by the conscious mind, affect the
content and quality of reasoning processes.95 Conscious thoughts modify emotions,
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but emotional processes also influence thought processes and cause behavioural
choices that conflict with consciously held ethics or intentions.96 Furthermore, the
infinitely complex bigger picture that has emerged from the totality of
neurobehavioural science is wholly inconsistent with the assumption in law that
rationality functions independent from unconscious emotional processing or that it
overrides emotional impulse. Stanford neurobiologist and best selling science writer
Robert Sapolsky successfully paints this picture in Behave: The Biology of Humans
at Our Best and Worst.97

Behave describes the complexity of the neuro-biological determinants of human
behaviour and how our capacity for choice is formed in an inseparable, causal
feedback relationship with the social environment. Genes, developmental
experiences, cultural conditioning, and unconscious sensory cues shape our
neurological capacity for behaviour.98 Variables such as exposure to stress
hormones in gestation, childhood poverty and abuse are linked to the development
of neurological impairments associated with dysfunctional adult behaviour. 99 Rather
than being reduced to brains, humans are described as unique and complex social
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animals. In Behave, human behaviour seems less determined than overdetermined:
many factors are in play.100

With dysfunctional or anti-social behaviour there is not usually a single smoking gun,
although brain tumours have been linked to specific crimes in the past.101 Traumatic
childhood stress can cause multiple neurological impairments that together function
to limit capacity for behavioural choice in a manner that reinforces itself and prevents
access to social environmental conditions and experiences which might support
positive neurological changes. For example, the amygdala, a brain structure involved
in aggression, fear and anxiety, is inextricably linked with other regions of the brain it
receives and sends signals to, as well as biochemical systems involved in those
communicative processes.102 Traumatic stress in childhood is linked to development
of an overactive amygdala, alongside other neurological impairments in emotional
regulation, impulse control, empathy, and cognition such as learning and memory.103
Therefore an adult who suffered abuse in childhood is at risk for multiple neurological
impairments that can prevent the formation of stable, supportive relationships, social
integration and limit economic opportunities.104
100
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The discussion of genetic and epigenetic research in Behave demonstrates the
entanglement of nurture and nature and provides a basis for understanding how
intergenerational trauma is passed on in both genes and parenting.105
Developmental experiences are encoded in genes which in turn initiate neurological
change.106 Our genetic inheritance from our parents contains coding they acquire
through their experiences in the social environment, which is then modified during
our own development.107 Genetics and epigenetics, along with research establishing
neuroplasticity in adults, undercuts the stereotype of the bad apple by demonstrating
how interactions with the social and physical environment continue to shape
neurological capacity throughout our life span. 108

Sapolsky also harnesses neuroscience to challenge the Cartesian dichotomy
between thought and emotion, or mind and body, that is at the root of common sense
misunderstandings of the role rationality plays in behaviour.109 Such
misunderstandings are also at the root of retributive folk psychology. Despite initial
resistance within neuroscience itself, it is now well established that the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dLPFC), the region associated with conscious rational thought
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processes does not function independently, but is enmeshed with the much older,
limbic system that regulates emotional affect.110

All of this suggests that conscious reasoning processes, their content or quality, are
modified by emotional responses triggered by particular decisions in their particular
contexts.111 This conclusion is supported by research. For example, moral reasoning
and judgments differ when subjects consider their own behaviour against the same
behaviour in others. 112 Furthermore, there appears to be no link between conscious
moral reasoning and moral, altruistic or prosocial behaviour. Evidence of inactivity or
activity of the dlPFC in decision making does not reliably predict “good” (or moral)
decisions. In fact, patterns of activation in the limbic regions associated with
unconscious stress and emotional response are a much better predictor of altruistic
or prosocial behaviour.113 Damage to the limbic system, coupled with unimpaired
dlPFC function, produces practical, or “cold hearted”, moral judgments.114 Numerous
studies demonstrate that a human can “know the difference between right and wrong
but, for reasons of organic impairment, not be able to do the right thing.”115 By
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contrast, those who consistently demonstrate moral or pro-social behaviour tend to
think about their decisions less, not more. 116

Sapolsky’s analysis arrives at conclusions that apply to all humans, not just those
with diagnosed disorders. However, neuroscientific research into impulse control
disorders such as antisocial personality Disorder (ASPD) and borderline personality
disorder (BPD) also evidences the conclusion that criminal conduct is not controlled
by conscious thought processes. As will be discussed in chapter five, ASPD and
BPD are mental disorders which are highly prevalent amongst criminal offenders.
Development of ASPD and BPD has been linked to adverse childhood events and
experiences.117 Research involving individuals with these disorders confirms
Sapolsky’s claim that the capacity to use moral reasoning to form intentions, values
or moral judgments is distinct from the capacity to make choices and behave in
accordance with them. ASPD and BPD have been linked to neurological differences
in brain structures involving emotional regulation, empathy, and impulse control but
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are not associated with impaired capacity for reasoning.118 This suggests a need to
reform the “Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder” (NCRMD)
doctrine in Canada.119 As Stephen Penny explains, although ASPD and BPD impair
the capacity to act in accordance with intentions, because they do not impair the
capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong, they do not meet the
criteria for the NCRMD verdict.120 Within the NCRMD doctrine, awareness of the
difference between right and wrong is collapsed into an ability to act in accordance
with such distinctions.

Sapolsky, who was publishing in the law and neuroscience field before Behave,
devotes a chapter to the relevance of neuro-behavioural science to criminal
justice.121 In his view, the retributive folk psychology is based around the mythical
idea that somewhere in the brain there is a “homonculus” or mini-me at a control
panel who remains vigilant and in charge of behaviour apart from exceptional
circumstances that disable it.122 For Sapolsky, moral progress in criminal justice
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coincides with the abandonment of such metaphysical explanations of criminal
behaviour.123 Yet discussions of criminal responsibility continue to demonstrate a
pernicious contradiction where individual proclivities, personality or physical
limitations are accepted as biologically determined, while our ability or inability to
resist acting on these dispositions is attributed to a transcendent moral agency.124
Sapolsky states, “of all the stances on mitigated free will, the one that assigns
aptitude to biology and effort to free will, or impulse to biology and resisting it to free
will, is the most permeating and destructive”.125 Imputing moral blame and punishing
offenders based on myths regarding our capacity for rationality is no different from
convicting epileptics for witchcraft.

Sapolsky does not claim that neuroscience has all the answers, but thinks that what
it has demonstrated should be enough to accept that the criminal justice system has
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been founded on false beliefs and is in need of reform. Although some
neuroscientific data is merely descriptive, causation has been demonstrated in some
experiments that use transcranial magnetic stimulation to trigger decisions and
behaviour in subjects.126 Prediction of individual behaviour is much less reliable but
research has established strong variable correlates that support probabilistic
predictions at group level. In Sapolsky’s view, neuro-science based criminal justice
reform should not wait because “perfectly smart” people fill in unexplained gaps with
an imaginary homonculus.127

iii) Neuroscience Versus Folk Psychology
The description of human choice and behaviour based on the neuroscience has
been critically characterized by some as “mechanistic,” “reductionist,” merely
“descriptive,” and of dubious relevance to normative questions in criminal law.128
Stephen J Morse argues that the neuroscience of free will describes conscious
thought processes as superfluous, or mere narration, and as if humans act as mere
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automata with a capacity for reasoning that has no causal consequence.129 In
reaction to a study in which researchers were able to predict shopping choices from
brain images he decries, “[neuroscience] betrays once again the mechanistic view of
human activity. What people do is simply a product of brain regions and
neurotransmitters. The person disappears. There is no shopper. There is only a brain
in a mall.”130

For Morse, the neuroscientific account of human behaviour is wholly incompatible
with legal concepts of personhood, agency and responsibility.131 Morse’s reductionist
arguments target particular neuroscience experiments that are by their nature
reductive in the manner that limited variables are isolated for observation. 132 He has
not published any specific response to Sapolsky’s more holistic neuroscientific
description of behaviour in Behave. However it would not likely change his position
or arguments. Morse unequivocally maintains that until neuroscience supplies a
129
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sufficiently totalitarian account of human behaviour disproving the “laws view of a
person” it is irrelevant to criminal law. He states:
the law's “official” position …. is justified unless and until neuroscience
or any other discipline demonstrates convincingly that humans are not
the creatures we think we are. That is, if humans are not conscious
and intentional creatures who act for reasons that play a causal role in
our behaviour, then the foundational facts for responsibility ascriptions
are mistaken. If it is true, for example, that we are all automata, then
no one is an agent, no one is acting and, therefore, no one can be
responsible for action. 133

As Morse understands, the folk psychological justifications of criminal punishment do
not even depend on a free will. Rationality need only function as a cause, but not the
dominant or controlling cause of behaviour in law’s folk psychology as he describes
it:
The law's view of the person is thus the so-called “folkpsychological” model: a view of the person as a conscious (and
potentially self-conscious) creature capable of practical reason, an
agent who forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the
person's desires and beliefs. We are the sort of creatures that can
act for and respond to reasons. The law properly treats persons
generally as intentional creatures and not as mechanical forces of
nature. Law and morality are action- guiding and could not guide
people ex ante and ex post unless people could use rules as
premises in their practical reasoning. Otherwise, law and morality
as action-guiding normative systems of rules would be useless,
and perhaps incoherent. Law is a system of rules that, at the least,
is meant to guide or influence behaviour and thus to operate as a
potential cause of behaviour.134

Based on this description of folk psychology derived from existing American legal
doctrines, Morse argues that even if neuroscience has debunked free will, it poses
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no challenge to the status quo.135 As discussed in chapter two, Canadian liability
doctrines developed in post-Charter jurisprudence have relied on moral philosophy
and established that moral voluntariness is required for culpability.136 In contrast,
American liability doctrines do not include concepts like ‘moral voluntariness’. In the
Model Penal Code, physical voluntariness is all that is required to establish intent.137
Morse’s description of retributive folk psychology is thus very different from Canada’s
which explicitly states that our capacity for rationality is what enables us to overcome
our impulses and control our behaviour.138

As Morse’s folk psychology does not rely on traditional retributive moral theory, it is
also quite different from the folk psychology under attack from neuro-reformers.139
135
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None have denied that the law performs a behavioural guiding function that
influences choices or that its presence or absence makes no difference in how we
behave. However this alone does not support the conclusion that when individuals
do not behave in accordance with the law it is an individual moral failure deserving of
punishment. Greene and Cohen argue that retributive folk psychology is not suitable
for public policy because it is based on a metaphysical overestimation of the
capacity for rationality that conflicts with neuroscience.140 As opposed to
blameworthy and deserving of punishment, they argue that criminals are more
accurately understood as “victims of neuronal circumstance”.141 Sapolsky’s
arguments are less philosophical and more humanitarian. He is concerned with the
morality of a criminal justice system that blames and imposes suffering on individuals
when neuroscience has demonstrated that our biological capacity for behavioural
choices is shaped by genetic and developmental variables outside conscious
control.

While neuro-reformers acknowledge the limits of present science, they maintain that
there is no evidence in science that supports the theoretical assumptions within
retributive folk psychology. As Sapolsky emphasizes, gaps in science do not justify
blame and punishment.142 These core concerns are never addressed by Morse, who
still rests on the conclusion that those found criminally responsible or culpable
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should be given their just deserts.143 As others have pointed out, Morse provides no
reasons for his conclusion that retributive folk psychology remains valid until
"science conclusively demonstrates that human beings cannot be guided by reasons
and that mental states play no role in explaining behaviour".144 It is left hanging as an
assertion.

Unlike Morse, Michael S Moore concedes that the entire notion of culpable
wrongdoing and moral desert is based on the folk psychology and metaphysical
concepts of traditional retributive moral theory. 145 What he calls “cheap
compatibilism” should not be used to side step inquiry into the challenges posed by
neuroscience. 146 However, Moore maintains that even if neuroscience has debunked
free will, the debate about retributive folk psychology cannot be resolved based on
empirical evidence alone.147 Whether the scientific claims of neuroscience are true is
only the threshold question. Moore also notes that answering it necessarily involves
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both empirical data and interpretation or philosophizing. If true, the next line of
inquiry is “whether [the neuroscientific claim] matters to our basic sense of
ourselves, our agency, our responsibility and our punishability”.148 He also says that
In consideration of the social and political dimensions of legal institutions it is
necessary to consider “whether many or most people now believe them to be true
and relevant, or whether many or most people will in the future or would in certain
circumstances come to believe certain things about such issues”.149

Neuro-reformer arguments do not meet the standards put forward by Moore, in part
because their arguments unnecessarily implicate concepts of determinism and free
will. As discussed there is not a consensus in science in this regard and may never
be. Furthermore, as John Searle points out, “the special problem of free will is that
we cannot get on with our lives without presupposing free will.”150 Meaning,
regardless of what one concludes about it they still experience their lives as involving
choices, deliberating options and making decisions. Accordingly, if the claim being
assessed within Moore’s framework is broadly framed around the existence of free
will, it would fail to proceed past his first question and would fail the second step of
his test as well.

Neuro-reformer arguments would also fail the second step of Moore’s test in their
failure to engage with traditional legal concepts such as agency, responsibility, and
autonomy. As both Morse correctly points out these concepts are intended to
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correspond with our sense of self, inform how the law governs our interactions with
each other and the state and are therefore of central importance to criminal law.151
Liability doctrines based on folk psychology are what delimit the authority of the state
to intervene with the liberty of citizens and impose punishment.152 According to
Morse, retributive folk psychology “enhances liberty, dignity, and autonomy by
leaving people free to pursue their projects unless they responsibly commit a crime”
or commit crimes while lacking “responsible agency.” It is therefore essential to
protect the possibility of a “good life”.153 For these reasons he also argues that the
insanity defence should be limited to apply only to mental disorders that impair
rationality to preserve protection of autonomy and free choice.154 For Morse and
others, law’s folk psychology and understanding of personhood and responsibility
provide the theoretical bulwark that prevents the state from interfering with individual
liberty.155

Sapolsky concedes that brain scan images have been given inappropriate weight in
US courtrooms, but is otherwise dismissive of Morse’s arguments. Morse’s self
identification as a “thoroughgoing materialist” is seen as fundamentally at odds with
other statements he makes like “Brains don’t kill...people kill people” and “We live in
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a causal universe, which includes human actions.”156 Sapolsky takes these as
empirical claims, and cannot see how this distinction can be maintained without
invocation of a homunculus that occasionally is “overwhelmed by compulsion” but
which otherwise is in charge of behavioural choices.157 Morse’s concerns that the
account of behaviour offered by neuroscience indicates that no one is responsible, is
set aside as a “crazy-making, inane challenge.”158 Behave also offers very little
comment regarding alternative normative justifications of criminal justice or how
sentencing offenders for criminal conduct can be justified without moral blame.
Ignoring the obvious fact that violent crimes form only a portion of criminalized
conduct, Sapulsky states that “no rational person who rejects free will actually
believes this” because “people must be protected by individuals who are
dangerous”.159

Sapolsky is cognizant of the cultural differences between law and neuroscience,
such as the law’s use of categorical distinctions and linear thinking to arrive at
conclusions.160 His efforts to explain neuroscience in lay terms legal scholars can
understand, and identify how the categorical distinctions in law are incompatible with
it, are commendable. However, Sapolsky stops short of bridging the cultural gap. He
makes attempt to redefine autonomy or responsibility to harmonize with
156
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neuroscience, or translate neuroscience into new categorical distinctions the law can
use to draw conclusions. Sapolsky also does explain why doing so may not be
necessary to inform a criminal justice system consistent with the foundational values
of liberal democratic societies.

Other neuro-reformer arguments also fail to engage with the normative challenges
Morse and Moore put forward. According to Greene and Cohen, retributive folk
psychology should be abandoned, but wholesale reform of criminal law is not
necessary because “there are perfectly good, forward-looking justifications for
punishing criminals that do not depend on metaphysical fictions.”161 They offer up
consequentialist or utilitarian justifications to replace retribution, while offering very
little attention to criticisms of this model with respect to the lack of protective
individual rights and constraints on the state’s authority to punish.162 In response to
the concern of over-punishment, no consideration is given to the history of
indeterminate sentencing during the rehabilitative penal era in the United States or
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its legacy of indeterminate sentences.163 They state that “[t]he idea that such
practices could, in the real world, make society happier... is absurd”.164 In response
to the criticism that consequentialism better justifies punishment practices but
provides inadequate justification for imposing it on a particular individual, they offer
the counter criticism that because retributive justifications are grounded in
metaphysics and scientifically dubious they should not be used in law.165

More fleshed out proposals from neuro-reformers also fail to offer alternative
justificatory frameworks that provide for individual rights that protect against overpunishment. Philosopher Gregg Caruso identifies as a free will skeptic.166 He
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advocates for a public health-quarantine model of criminal justice.167 It is founded on
the conclusion that crime should be treated akin to a public health problem because
research demonstrates that the very same variables that are determinative of poor
health are also linked with adverse brain development, impulsivity and criminal
behaviour.168 His model would abolish punishment and prisons as they currently
exist in North America and require criminal justice interventions to function in
accordance with treatment practices supported by scientific evidence established in
mental health fields of practice. 169

Under Caruso’s model the sentence must be proportionate to the danger posed by
an individual and impose the least infringement on liberty necessary for public
safety.170 However indeterminate sentences and indefinite confinement would be
justified if necessary to protect the public. Like the rehabilitative model, the public
health quarantine model does not restrict sentence length to the seriousness of the
criminal conduct. It also does not provide for individual rights that limit or constrain
the state discretionary power to determine sentence length and impose treatments to
pursue its public safety objective.171 Because of this shortcoming, John Lemos
167

Greg D Caruso, “The Public Health-Quarantine Model” forthcoming in Dana Nelkin and Derk
Pereboom eds, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, (New York: Oxford University Press),
online: Social Science Research Network <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068021>.
168

Gregg Caruso, “Public Health and Safety: The Social Determinants of Health and Criminal
Behaviour” (UK: ResearchLinks Books, October 17, 2017), online: Social Science Research
Network, <https://ssrn.com / abstract=3054747>.
169

Caruso, supra note 167 at 5.

170

Ibid, at 5.

171

Caruso, supra note 167 at 5 citing Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),at 156: “if a criminal cannot be rehabilitated, ...and our
safety requires his indefinite confinement, this [model] provides no justification for making his life
more miserable than would be required to guard against the danger he poses.”

!47

argues that Caruso’s framework enables over-punishment and could justify a
removal of trial protections.172 He shares Morse’s central concern: if “one rejects
belief in moral responsibility then one loses the resources to explain the inherent
wrongness of punishing the innocent”.173

iv) Epistemological Impasse
Apart from lack of agreement, the debate regarding neuro-reform demonstrates a
deeper disconnect between the way neuroscience describes human behaviour and
the way we think about personhood in the law. It is evident in Morse’s assertions that
brains do not commit crimes, people do. The lack of meaningful engagement can
also be observed in the cursory responses neuroscientists offer to thick normative
challenges from their critics, and their failure to offer alternative frameworks
responsive to such concerns.

This impasse is consistent with epistemic differences between science and law.174
Scientific inquiry produces empirical data that, when consolidated, provides
explanatory causal descriptions of phenomenological events and processes. While
inquiry is driven and influenced by the values of investigators and the community of
inquirers, the empirical data and causal relationships established in scientific inquiry
do not direct one particular interpretive meaning with regard to normative
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questions.175 Empiricism is a genuine attempt to transcend the variance of subjective
interpretation. Its “basic building block of knowledge” is sense or “brute datum,”
which can be “verified” by repeated recordings by multiple recorders and cannot be
questioned by alternative interpretations. 176 Interpretations of datum are inferential
conclusions constructed from an epistemology of logical empiricism.177
Interpretations must themselves be verifiable through brute datum to be considered
empirical. In Charles Taylor’s words, the empiricist orientation must be innately
“hostile to enquiry based on interpretation” such as political science or law, because
it “cannot meet the requirements of intersubjective, non-arbitrary verifications which
it considers essential to science.”178

Neuroscience has enabled us to observe and better understand the causal variables
and underlying mechanisms that prevent, limit, or support particular behavioural
choices, but it does not, and cannot, tell us what concepts such as responsibility,
agency or autonomy mean in light of its empirical data.179 Neuro-reformers who are
also jurists can also fail to acknowledge the limits of empiricism. Peter Alces reasons
that to accomplish its goals “law must affect the human agent” and “take the qualities
175
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of the human agent, what we are, seriously”.180 He claims “research into how the
brain defines what and who we are” and from this foundation he purports to
reconceive law “from the moral foundations up”. 181 In doing so, Alces proceeds as if
morality is an object, and does not acknowledge the interpolative leaps and
metaphysical construction within his arguments. Although empirical observations and
knowledge may provoke intuitive moral judgements, it does not in itself give
objective reasons for those judgements.

Epistemic murkiness is also evident in the debate around what neuroscience must
disprove to necessitate reform. Neuroscience can only produce knowledge regarding
‘free will’ when neuroscience pre-defines what it means, or what brute datum
establishes its presence or absence. A ‘mental state’ has no correspondence to any
object, but cognitive processes, defined according to brute datum, can be identified

180
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Press, 2018) at 2.
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and observed in neuronal and biochemical activity within the brain.182 Neuroscience
cannot establish determinism, because the field of inquiry is localized in the brain,
and the data it produces cannot support empirical claims about matters external to it.
Furthermore, neuroscience has no knowledge of the subjective, experiential realm of
human life, which remains permanently “outside the bounds of its epistemological
orientation” that relies on intersubjective verification.183 Justice itself is not an object,
but a concept outside the epistemological boundaries of science. 184 The argument
that retribution theory must be abandoned as a justification of punishment because
science conflicts with its normative metaphysical concepts is not so clear cut in the
legal tradition, or in science. 185
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Morse’s arguments regarding the disconnect between neuroscience and central
legal concepts, such as agency and responsibility, apprehend these limitations and
the normative void abandonment of folk psychology would leave. His orientation is
also consistent with the epistemic culture of law, which prefers its “own institutional
self-understandings” when balancing “factual assertions of science and the
normative dictates of law against one another.”186 He states:
Law addresses problems genuinely related to responsibility,
including consciousness, the formation of mental states such as
intention and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and
compulsion, but it never addresses the presence or absence of
free will. People sometimes use “free will” loosely to refer to
genuine responsibility doctrines, but this distracts from the real
issues and perpetuates confusion. The only practical free will
problem in law is the confusion among lawyers, scientists and
others who think that free will is a legal criterion or who speak and
write as if it is.187

Morse entertains the possibility that neuroscience “can be potentially helpful… if the
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological framework.” 188 This
position effectively insulates law’s normative understanding of human behaviour and
concepts like rationality and compulsion from the empirical knowledge produced by
the disciplines dedicated to studying it. It also stagnates the law’s working definition
of human nature to ideas formed in the minds of philosophers centuries ago, living in
a very different world with different concerns.
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The position that contemporary neuroscience is only relevant to criminal law if it
corresponds with its already defined concepts is also inconsistent with overarching
principles of the Canadian justice system. As will be discussed more in chapter four,
contemporary Canadian jurisprudence acknowledges that legal norms and political
values are not fixed objects, but fluid concepts with meanings that vary across
contexts and evolve according to our experiences, observations and understanding
of our social environment and practices.189 For the law to meaningfully serve
established values at any particular time, or in any particular case, it must evolve
with society. This is demonstrated in the approach taken to constitutional
interpretation. To ensure these instruments are “capable of adapting with the times
by way of a process of evolutionary interpretation within the natural limits of the text”,
and "accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life", the metaphorical
principle of the ‘living tree’ has been adopted.190 Evolution is still constrained, as the
law must grow “from its roots” in a manner connected to foundational democratic
values and those enshrined in the Charter.191

In summary, the current discourse between law and neuroscience regarding
retributive folk psychology is akin to two people attempting to have a conversation in
189
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different languages that lack corresponding terms. While Sapolsky provides a rich
synthesis of meaningful information regarding human behaviour and the manner it is
constrained by our developmentally shaped neurological capacity, he does not
translate this into foundational legal concepts such as responsibility and autonomy.
Neuro-reformers also advance consequentialist or utilitarian justifications for criminal
justice, but do not offer any other framework for deriving individual rights that limit
state interference. Both Morse and Moore maintain that to be relevant to criminal
justice, neuroscience must be considered in light of established concepts such as
autonomy and responsibility. However, neither contemplate whether the meaning of
these concepts can or should be redefined based on the new knowledge offered by
neuroscience. Furthermore, the discourse is hindered by its focus on free will, a
metaphysical concept subject to ongoing philosophical debate, and its failure to
focus on the implications of less controversial empirical conclusions, such as the
enmeshment of the limbic system with the dlPFC.

To further explore the relevance of neuroscience to retributive folk psychology and
the morality of the punishment practices it justifies, a way around the epistemic
divide between criminal law and neuroscience is necessary. The next chapter
sketches out a framework for inquiry derived from principles developed by
pragmatist philosophers as an appropriate means to do so.

!54

CHAPTER IV
PRAGMATIC INQUIRY
The poem of the mind in the act of finding
What will suffice. It has not always had
To find: the scene was set; it repeated what
Was in the script.
Then the theatre was changed
To something else. Its past was a souvenir.
- Wallace Stevens

192

Philosophy has long grappled with the questions of what truth is, how it can be
known, or whether humans can know it at all.193 The advent of modern science
intensified this concern.194 Some camps in philosophy attempted to make their
methods as rigorous as science to ensure the legitimacy of their knowledge
claims.195 Others attempted to carve out an orientation that would enable philosophy
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to contribute meaningfully to political discourse and human progress.196 Pragmatism
belongs to the latter camp. 197

Holistically, principles of pragmatist writing provide a methodological approach to
normative and moral inquiry aimed at conclusions capable of supporting progressive
institutional practices in democratic societies. This chapter discusses the general
principles of pragmatic philosophy and explains how an application of its methods
can move inquiry past the epistemological impasse identified in the law and
neuroscience debate.

i) Acceptance of Uncertainty and Contingency
Pragmatist writings are founded in the acceptance of an inconvenient
acknowledgement: language and rationality can never arrive at a bedrock of truth.198
There is no doorway through which we can apprehend a mind-independent reality
that exists out there.199 This does not mean we must abandon rationality and retire to
solipsism or skepticism. Pragmatist writings re-conceive rational discourse and moral
inquiry and explain why letting go of the pretense of absolutist justifications can
better support social progress in democratic societies.
196
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Acknowledging the elusiveness of certainty, and that facts and values are
irretrievably entangled, prompts inquirers to recognize unconscious, epistemological
values or biases they bring to the task.200 This, they suggest, is better than trying to
pretend they do not exist.

In law, a pragmatic lens forces us to acknowledge the contingent, man-made nature
of what we take in law to be given, or ‘natural’, such as the assumptions that
underpin retributive folk psychology. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes points out,
nature and culture are not two distinct categories but “porous, permeable and
continuous with one another”.201 It follows, necessarily, that our theories of human
nature are going to be contingent products of our culture. Pragmatism works to
interrogate and undermine the founding assumptions of epistemologies, hence its
characterization as an anti-foundationalist movement.202

From a pragmatic viewpoint, an anti-foundationalist perspective is the only way to
acknowledge pluralism and respect difference when engaging in inquiry and
discourse with respect to moral and political issues.203 Recognizing that absolute
truth is undiscoverable, William James describes pluralism as the permanent form of
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the world.204 Accordingly, there will always be various “points of view” which must be
accounted for.205 Pluralism also implicates important cultural and ethical
consequences for autonomy and social justice. James was concerned with the
“blindness with which we are all afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and
people different from ourselves” and the falsity of judgements that “presume to
decide in an absolute way on the value of other person’s conditions or ideals.” 206

Starting with a recognition of pluralism and the elusiveness of certainty, the
pragmatic method accounts for real differences amongst individuals as well as
contingencies of time, place, and circumstances.207 It thus allows for the continual
revision of our understanding and reconstruction of our norms as experience evolves
over time. With respect to retributive folk psychology, the pragmatic conclusion is
that no matter how foundational it has become in law, it cannot be said that it
corresponds to transcendent, timeless justice or morality. It is a collection of ideas
about human nature and morality formed in response to contingencies of a past
world. Its longevity does not provide evidence that retributive folk psychology
corresponds with any unquestionable, universal sense of self or morality shared in
society now. A real acknowledgement of pluralism prompts the necessary conclusion
that when he makes that claim, Professor Morse can only speak for himself.208
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Pragmatism also rejects any notion that rigid adherence and application of its
doctrines ensures just outcomes. Justice Holmes’s pragmatic jurisprudence
exemplifies a rejection of the idea that “correct outcomes can be deduced from some
overarching principle”. 209 Prioritizing context over precedent, Holmes’s jurisprudence
applies historical analysis to expose seemingly timeless abstract legal concepts as
originally derived from contingent and context-specific needs.210 For Holmes,
“absolute truth is a mirage,” and systems of concrete fixed principles and axiomatic
rules are symptomatic of what Richard Bernstein calls ‘Cartesian anxiety’.211 Judicial
decision making must be able to evolve with social experience and respond to
contingencies. 212 Constraining this task to logically derived principles is inconsistent
with this function because “whatever is right in one moment may be wrong in the
209
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next.”213 To remain responsive to social experience, the law must change with
changing circumstances and benefit from, and contribute to, the progress of
knowledge. Holme’s understood law as a never-ending experiment aimed at
progress:
[T]he theory of our Constitution […] is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
While that experiment is part of our system, I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe.214
Contemporary legal pragmatist Judge Richard Posner joins Justice Holmes in
rejecting the belief that a fixed set of rules enables judges to discern the ‘correct’
outcome. Posner advocates approaching legal problems concretely, free from
illusions, with awareness of the limits of rationality, pluralism, the ‘localness’ of
human knowledge, and the unattainability of absolute truth.215

Canadian jurisprudence, outside of the criminal context, appears to have
apprehended the concerns of pragmatist writers and judges. To foster the peaceful
co-existence of different values and practices,216 the Supreme Court has held that
constitutional interpretation must seek both to accommodate and promote “diversity
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and pluralism in the public life of our communities.”217 Respect for differences in the
law is necessary to support social stability and progress in a multicultural society:
These shared values — equality, human rights and democracy — are
values the state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and
protecting. They enhance the conditions for integration and points of
civic solidarity by helping connect us despite our differences...This is
what makes pluralism work. … [a] multicultural multireligious society
can only work ... if people of all groups understand and tolerate each
other...Religious freedom must therefore be understood in the context
of a secular, multicultural and democratic society with a strong
interest in protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and
ensuring the vitality of a common belief in human rights...218
When pluralism is accepted, contextual pragmatic analysis naturally emerges as the

only means through which constitutional cases can be decided. 219 The Supreme
Court has, on multiple occasions, dismissed or avoided metaphysical questions.220
Consistent with the living tree doctrine, constitutional interpretation has taken a
pragmatic turn in the latter half of the twentieth century and abandoned "rigid
template[s]" that risk “consideration of irrelevant matters on the one hand, or
overlooking relevant considerations on the other”.221 Instead, contextual analysis is
217
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applied to consider the “larger social, political and legal context” of a claim, and
changes in human activity. 222

ii) Practices & Values
Abandoning the search for absolute foundations does not defeat normative inquiry
but directs and guides it towards its real purpose: solving legal problems and
progressively achieving better justice. The original pragmatic maxim was that inquiry
should be grounded in consideration of the “practical bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception to have.” 223 Establishing absolutist principles of truth is
beside the point. James states that pragmatism:
[a]sks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea or belief be true,’ it says, ‘what
concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life?’
‘How will the truth be realized?’ ‘What existences will be different from
those which would obtain if the belief were false?’ ‘What, in short, is
the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms? 224
This does not mean the inquiry into practical consequences proceeds untethered.
Rather, a pragmatic approach connects the assessment of consequences to the
purposive values of the community of inquiry.

According to John Dewey, philosophical inquiry should be aimed at developing
institutions and practices that support the realization of liberal democratic values.225
Achieving meaningful freedom necessitates a continual willingness “to question
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received ideas in science and philosophy” and to “think and observe and experiment
for themselves.”226 An ideal liberal society can only be achieved if the state provides
the means through which citizens can develop their capacity to participate in
democratic discourse and achieve their potential.227 Institutional practices must
remain the focus of inquiry because, “the ends of freedom and individuality for all
can be attained only by the means that accord with those ends”.228

Richard Rorty also agrees that the goal of moral inquiry, or questions about what is
right, should be the realization of core liberal value.229 Rather than asking what is
truly right, Rorty suggests we instead ask what we should do; or what practices we
should adopt to achieve freedom and reduce cruelty and suffering.230 Social
practices and institutions should be thought of "experiments in cooperation rather
than attempts to embody a universal and ahistorical order.”231 This approach is
consistent with the Supreme Courts purposive approach to Charter rights. Justices
McLachlin and Lebel explain:
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The purposes underlying Charter rights and freedoms may be
framed at the broadest level, a purposive interpretation must be
consistent with the "larger objects of the Charter", including "basic
beliefs about human worth and dignity" and the maintenance of "a
free and democratic political system"...At the same time, however,
while Charter rights and freedoms should be given a broad and
liberal interpretation, a purposive analysis also requires courts to
consider the most concrete purpose or set of purposes that
underlies the right or freedom in question, based on its history and
full context....232

The rigid adherence to the retributive folk psychology in section 7 jurisprudence in
the criminal law context does not accord with the purposive approach taken in the
adjudication of Charter rights in other contexts. It is assumed, without contextual,
purposive analysis that retributive folk psychology is both adequate and necessary to
protect individual’s section 7 rights, and then applied to foreclose any inquiry into
individual and social constraints on choice.233 This will be discussed more in the next
chapters. In contrast, outside of the criminal context, section 7 jurisprudence
engages in contextual analysis to determine what protections the right to life, liberty,
and security of person provides individuals.234 Furthermore, the jurisprudence has
acknowledged that the right to both dignity and autonomy are engaged by section 7,
and that psychological suffering impacts the integrity of the individual.235 As will be
discussed in the next chapters, consideration of the psychological suffering involved
in punishment and its impact on integrity is foreclosed when proportionality is
assessed in sentencing determinations.
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iii) Objectivity
Pragmatic inquiry also does not occur in a vacuum of subjectivity. We can still make
distinctions and judgements, establish practical standards and norms, so long as we
treat them as contingent rather than absolute. In pragmatic inquiry and practice,
some beliefs should be treated as indubitable, but all must be considered fallible.236
Beliefs are not taken to be true in any empirical or metaphysical sense and should
be thought of as William James puts it, “rules for action” arrived at based on the
difference in practice they support.237 An example of this balance can be found in the
practice of law. When advising clients, lawyers treat current law as indubitable while
knowing it can change and that their advice is therefore fallible.

Treating beliefs as fallible and norms as contingent does not mean pragmatic inquiry
is relativistic. Rorty avoids this by focusing inquiry away from principles to practice:
In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties
into which "the Relativist" keeps getting himself is to move
everything over from epistemology and metaphysics into cultural
politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to
suggestions about what we should try.238

Other pragmatist writers have placed higher importance on objectivity and rationality,
while still emphasizing that transcendent objectivity independent of any perspective
cannot be apprehended or appealed to for authority. Hilary Putnam explains that
inquiry can still achieve objectivity in the standards adopted to arrive at concrete
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conclusions and resolutions to problems situated in a particular place and time.239
Even science cannot be seen as arriving at absolute objectivity because empirical
observation does not escape the filter of human perception and cognition. However,
the type of objectivity Putnam identifies in science, is in its standards applied in
methodology, peer review and replication. These objective standards enable
progress to occur by providing a framework for participation, collaboration, and
discourse in the scientific community. 240 This type of objective validity is maintained
in law through precedent, procedural standards, rules of evidence, and standards of
review, all of which allow for its evolution within a framework of objective standards.

Furthermore, objectively ascertainable concepts and principles of law still perform an
important function in enabling legal norms to be discovered, understood, discussed
and recreated in democratic processes and institutions. According to Jurgen
Habermas, rationality and objectivity is still of central importance to a liberal
democracy in the manner it enables communication, understanding, and agreement
across life worlds through discourse. 241 Only legal norms validated in discourse are
legitimate in a liberal democracy. 242 As Habermas states:
Norms appearing in the form of law entitle actors to exercise their
rights or liberties. However, one cannot determine which of these
laws are legitimate simply by looking at the form of individual
rights. Only by bringing in the discourse principle can one show
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that each person is owed a right to the greatest possible measure
of equal liberties that are mutually compatible.243
For Habermas, rational discourse is necessary to maintain freedom in a liberal state
because, “to the degree that interactions cannot be coordinated through achieving
understanding, the only alternative that remains is force exercised by one against
others.”244

Accordingly a pragmatic approach in law requires we both acknowledge that our
standards do not correspond to some transcendent form of justice, but must still be
arrived at through reasons and articulated in objective terms capable of validation in
democratic discourse. All of this suggests, that although retributive folk psychology
derives no validity from its origin, there is nothing inherently wrong with criminal law
using concepts originally derived from metaphysics or folk psychology to determine
legal questions if those norms are capable of being understood and validated in
discourse.

iv) Legal Theory
Some have characterized pragmatists as anti-theory, but this is not accurate.245
According to Posner, pragmatism only rejects theories which purport to correspond
or derive authority from a truth that exist “out there” in a speculative “mind
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independent reality.”246 Useful a posteriori theories of law that support the
construction of legal doctrine and institutions that respond meaningfully to evolving
human activity are still valid. As Posner explains, it is their functionality that gives
these theories validity:
I do not want to claim that these theories are successful because they
are true, or even that they are true. They are successful because they
help us control our physical and social environments. […] I am not
against moral theory tout court. Rather, I distinguish between theories
about morality and theories of morality, the latter being normative
theories about the content of our moral obligations. […] A theory of
morality, in contrast, is a theory of how we should behave. It tries to
get at the truth about our moral obligations.247
In Posner’s pragmatism moral judgments are not irrelevant, but if something is
objectionable for whatever reason, a moral theory will not, and should not, convince
otherwise. He explains, “we can decide to treat criminals with dignity because we
buy into the Kantian notion that people are entitled to be treated as ends”, or
because, “knowing or caring nothing of Kant’s ideas, it is believed that a “we-they" or
"enemy within or even a ‘medical’ mentality of criminal punishment” causes negative
social consequences.248 Using the example of police torture, Posner points out that
one need not make a utilitarian assessment (indeed, doing so would be an
abstraction that misses the point) to conclude that it is wrong, because it obstructs
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“specific political and criminological objectives of our society, having mainly to do
with reducing the amount of unauthorized violence”. 249 With a pragmatic approach,
we develop normative theories about the content of our obligations or rules to
achieve social, legal, and political objectives, but these should not gain particular
support from theories that make absolutist claims regarding right and wrong.250

This approach suggests that regardless of what neuroscience says, retributive folk
psychology may still be legitimate if it functions in a way to produce results that are
consistent with legal and political objectives and values. However, it also means that
retributive folk psychology gains no validity just because it was derived from
philosophical theories that purport to correspond with transcendent morality. As will
be discussed more in the next section, this applies equally to neuroscience.
Whether or not neuroscience should inform law reform ultimately depends on
whether it can better support the realization of the objectives and values the law is
bound to serve.

v) Science and Law
A pragmatic approach recognizes that epistemological values permeate all
experience, and that normative judgments are essential in all practices, even
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science.251 It also recognizes the distinct focus and purpose of science in
comparison to law.252 Science, as discussed, seeks to obtain brute datam and
establish causal relationships. In contrast, law is tasked with developing and
applying legal norms. When the area of inquiries of law and science overlap, as it
does in attempting to produce a functional understanding of human behaviour,
science can help inform the law, but it does not trump it.

Susan Haack offers a pragmatic approach that rejects both anti-science cynicism
and what she calls scientism.253 She describes cynicism as an “uncritically critical
attitude to science, an inability to see or an unwillingness to acknowledge its
remarkable intellectual achievements, or to recognize the real benefits it has made
possible”.254 On the other hand, scientism is an “over-enthusiastic and uncritically
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deferential attitude towards science, an inability to see or an unwillingness to
acknowledge its fallibility, limitations, and potential dangers.”255

According to Haack, science should not be seen as threatening, but as supportive of
legal systems when approached pragmatically. In particular, it supports law’s
capacity to evolve by “growth, expansion, adaptation to new niches and so on” and
shed norms and concepts that have lost functionality, in a manner similar to
language. 256 Science does this by providing the law with a richer understanding of
contextual variables that lay outside its institutional expertise. The case of Lavallee
provides an example of this in Canadian law. In that case the court consulted expert
testimony and social science evidence to understand the impact domestic abuse had
on the accused's perception to determine whether she acted in self defence.257
Justice Wilson explains why expert testimony was necessary:
[L]ong-standing recognition that psychiatric or psychological
testimony also falls within the realm of expert evidence is
predicated on the realization that in some circumstances the
average person may not have sufficient knowledge of or
experience with human behaviour to draw an appropriate
inference from the facts before him or her.258
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Retributive folk psychology purports to provide an account of human capacities for
cognition and behaviour. This sort of knowledge lies outside the expertise of law.
Neuroscience, on the other hand, is a discipline devoted to identifying and
understanding the root causal variables and neurological structures and processes
engaged in human cognition and behaviour. It thus should be viewed as supporting
the law’s understanding of these things and not rejected based on the belief that law
or its practitioners “are thoroughly knowledgeable about ‘human nature’ and that no
more is needed”.259

vi) Moving Beyond Impasse
Applying a pragmatic method to assess the conflict between retributive folk
psychology and neuroscience avoids the pitfalls identified in the debate discussed in
the last chapter. Pragmatism guides the inquiry away from philosophical debate
regarding free will and determinism. Even if these claims were established in
science, they are not helpful or relevant to the issue. In liberal democracies, criminal
justice seeks to maintain standards of social conduct and order in a way that
respects individual autonomy. A belief in either free will or determinism does not help
us figure out what to do about crime in a manner responsive to those concerns.
Furthermore, pragmatic assessment of the relevance of neuroscience to criminal law
cannot rest on its empirical validity, but rather the difference it might make in practice
if believed to be true.

Morse’s assertions that retributive folk psychology should be maintained unless
neuroscience proves that its related concepts are false also does not put to rest the
debate. This argument amounts to a defensive assertion of the self-evident value of
a contingent claim. It implicitly assumes that legal concepts of autonomy and
259
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responsibility as they are currently conceived, adequately function to ensure just
outcomes and could not be made better. They are convincing only to those who
share his beliefs that the law’s current language is just and neuroscientific
knowledge has no functional value on offer. In ignoring the epistemological values
and biases at the foundation of his arguments, Morse reduces interdisciplinary
discourse with neuroscience to a language-game rigged in favour of preserving the
law’s current norms and concepts.260 As Rorty says, “if we understand the rules of a
language-game, we understand all that there is to understand about why moves in
that language-game are made.”261 The conclusions Morse arrives at are thus valid
within the framework and rules he has established within his own argument, but they
do not engage with the substantive issues raised in neuro-reformer arguments.

Neither side of the debate discussed in chapter three manages to escape the
epistemic culture and language to engage in a meaningful discourse that bridges the
knowledge of law and neuroscience. The next chapter applies principles discussed
herein to further inquire into the relevance of neuroscience to the normative
assumptions of criminal law by examining how retributive folk psychology functions
in practice in the Canadian criminal justice system and whether neuroscience has
anything to offer in this regard.
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CHAPTER V
THE TERRIBLE DIFFERENCE BLAME & PUNISHMENT MAKES

Pragmatic principles tell us that when embarking on an assessment of legal norms in
consideration of reform, the question of what is true should be set aside and
consequences in practice should be the focus. With respect to retributive folk
psychology, the punishment practices its supports should be assessed according to
how they serve the overarching purpose and values of criminal justice and the
Canadian legal system. As will be discussed in this chapter, they produce negative
effects in several ways. Retributive folk psychology is applied inconsistently in
jurisprudence and confuses rather than unifies the law. Application of retributive
doctrines in judicial practice functions to foreclose inquiry into causal variables giving
rise to crime and veil the moral and normative basis of legal judgments. Sentencing
principles derived from retributive norms and punishment practices justified by folk
psychology function at cross purposes with both the aims of criminal justice and
overarching values of the legal system. In comparison, alternative practices that do
not seek to punish moral blame achieve better results and function more in harmony
with Charter values. For these reasons, retributive folk psychology and the
punishment practices it justifies should be discarded, and neuroscience should, in
part, inform a new way of thinking about criminal justice without retribution.

i) Doctrinal Problems
As discussed in the second chapter, central to criminal law is the notion that
punishment is not justified absent a conscious freely willed intention, that is
particularized in the mens rea element of criminal offences. This is characterized as
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respecting and protecting individual autonomy. 262 In the case of Sault Ste Marie,
Justice Dickson summarized the principle :
Where the offence is criminal, the Crown must establish a mental
element, namely, that the accused who committed the prohibited
act did so intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts
constituting the offence, or with wilful blindness toward them. Mere
negligence is excluded from the concept of the mental element
required for conviction. Within the context of a criminal prosecution
a person who fails to make such inquiries as a reasonable and
prudent person would make, or who fails to know facts he should
have known, is innocent in the eyes of the law. 263

After the Charter was enacted, the jurisprudence appeared to be moving towards the
conclusion that actual intention or subjective mens rea was necessary to justify
conviction and punishment.264 Reference Re Motor Vehicles held that because
section 7 prohibited punishment of the morally innocent imprisonment for absolute
liability offences was prohibited under the Charter. 265 Writing for the majority in
Vaillencourt, Justice Lamer went so far as to state that “[i]t may well be that, as a
general rule, the principles of fundamental justice require proof of a subjective mens
rea with respect to the prohibited act, in order to avoid punishing the 'morally
innocent'”.266 However subsequent decisions departed from this line of authority and
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post-Charter criminal jurisprudence has been criticized for lacking a “coherent
theoretical vision” of criminal law.267

As discussed in chapter two, Creighton was a point of departure in post-Charter
jurisprudence. In that case it was held that the mens rea element for negligence
offences punishable in prison was “not concerned with what was actually in the
accused's mind, but with what should have been there, had the accused proceeded
reasonably.”268 The assessment of mens rea in negligence offences purports to
establish blameworthiness by comparing the action of the accused against a
reasonable person standard. This holding has been criticized for inserting confusion
and unfairness into criminal law based on incoherent reasons.269 In particular,
assessing moral culpability according to an objective standard has been criticized for
unjustly foreclosing inquiry into relevant considerations such as race, gender,
education, class, and actual cognitive capacity. 270

Pre-Creighton jurisprudence appeared more or less to adhere to the principles of
traditional retributive moral theory or what Justice Wilson might identify as the
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Kantian foundations of our legal system. Creighton relied on normative theory
developed by HLA Hart which distinguishes moral guilt from legal guilt.271 As Hart
observes, the act of imposing suffering through punishment “appears to be a
mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of two evils of moral
wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good.”272 Consistent with the linguistic
turn in philosophy at the time, Hart’s theory avoids metaphysical claims that purport
to arrive at moral conclusions. 273 Instead he describes a closed, internally coherent
system of positive law and their purported justifications that is normative, rather than
moral in its conclusions. Accordingly, the Hartian approach taken in Creighton is
inconsistent with the entire notion replete in the jurisprudence that criminal
proceedings purport to determine, not simply legal guilt, but the moral
blameworthiness of the accused.

As Sylvestre points out, there is a fundamental inconsistency between the rhetorical
importance given to choice in determining moral blame and the lack of inquiry into
the actual state of mind of an accused or the circumstantial variables relevant to their
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conduct.274 She argues that the emphasis on finding personal fault in criminal legal
doctrines has long suffered from a lack of real connection to the philosophical
reasoning underlying retributive principles.275 Culpability assessments rely on
interpretive constructions that involve “technical and descriptive cognitive states of
mind such as intent and recklessness” and arrive at inferential conclusions about
internal states from the conduct of the accused.276 Because it functions in practice to
inpute blame from conduct and foreclose inquiry into the actual causal variables
involved in criminal conduct,277 Sylvestre concludes that mens rea is “nothing more
than a mythical legal category” or “simulacra”. 278 For her, this issue is central to the
social injustice systemically perpetrated within the criminal justice system:
Key concepts such as mens rea and actus reus are constructed and
applied in a very technical and descriptive manner that often casts
aside practical considerations, proceeds on utilitarian grounds, and
ignores or simplifies what it really means to be free, rational, and
different in a grossly unequal and pseudo-meritocratic society.
Offenders are thus convicted, irrespective of their differences and of
the impact of socio-economic and political constraints on their
choosing to commit crimes. 279

Furthermore the importance placed on free will choices in the doctrine appears to be
largely rhetorical. Normative concepts derived from it, like moral involuntariness, lack
objective ascertainable meaning when applied in practice. This is problematic
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because legal norms that lack the objectivity necessary to understand how they will
be applied cannot be validated in discourse, and are therefore illegitimate in a liberal
democracy.280 Benjamin Berger apprehends this problem within criminal
jurisprudence. In his view, incoherence in criminal liability doctrines are symptomatic
of a deeper tension building in the jurisprudence.281 Because of its emphasis on
objectivity and impartiality, the liberal vision of the public sphere is fundamentally at
odds with public moralizing.282 He views the decision in Ruzic as an example of how
the courts veil the actual normative basis of their decision by citing liberal principles
regarding free will and choice.283

In Ruzic, the accused was directed under threat in Yugoslavia to smuggle heroin into
Canada.284 Because Ruzic was not under immediate threat from someone present
when she committed the offence, the circumstances did not meet the requirements
for the defence of duress as it was written in the Criminal Code.285 The court found
that Ruzic’s will had been “overborne...by the threats of another” and that her actions
were “morally involuntary” and “not, in a realistic way, freely chosen.”286 Because
punishing those who act in a morally involuntary way “conflicts with the assumption
in criminal law that individuals are autonomous and freely choosing agents”, the
280
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decision held that moral voluntariness was a principle of fundamental justice
pursuant to section 7.287 The immediacy and presence requirements were struck
down from the defence, and the accused was acquitted.288

The principle of moral voluntariness has been characterized as “confusing.”289 The
Ruzic decision has also been criticized for expanding the duress defence without
appropriately limiting it,290 and elevating a vague and poorly defined principle to
Charter protected status.291 In Berger’s opinion, the court acquitted the accused
because it understood the emotional constraints the accused was under and veiled
its real reasons behind the idiom of moral involuntariness.292 This is problematic
because the principle hides the true reasons for the judgment behind a principle that
lacks objective meaning and predictability in its application. Berger states, “the
objection is that public moralizing is going on whether hidden behind the veil or not,
and the temperature of normative debate is still high. The idiom of moral
involuntariness is not a cooling agent but an oven mitt.”293 In his view, until the
inadequacy of the liberal, mechanistic view of human choice is addressed directly,
287
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the court will continue to develop principles and doctrine that are fundamentally at
odds with the liberal vision of law and order.

294

The inadequacy of retributive folk psychology is also evidenced by cases in which
the court does not apply it. In Wu and the more recent case of Boudreault,
imprisonment of poor offenders for non-payment of fines was determined to be
unconstitutional due to the offender’s lack of real choice. 295 In PHS Community
Services Society, the Attorney General’s argued that the choice of Insite clinic clients
to inject narcotics negated their claim that the closure of the safe injection site
violated their section 7 rights. 296 The decision notes that the area the clinic was
located was home to “some of the poorest and most vulnerable people in Canada
with life “histories of physical and sexual abuse as children, family histories of drug
abuse, early exposure to serious drug use, and mental illness.” 297 Rejecting the
government’s choice argument, the court affirms the conclusion of the trial judge
drawn from expert evidence: “that addiction is a disease in which the central feature
is impaired control over the use of the addictive substance.”298

PHS Community Health Services thus recognizes individual internal constraints on
choice and how they are connected to development in oppressive social conditions.
Bedford also demonstrates this recognition in assessing the constitutionality of
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criminal prohibitions preventing sex workers from accessing safety measures such
as a body guard. The Attorney General again argued that it was not the law but the
claimant’s choices that put them at risk for harm.299 Rejecting this argument again,
the decision states:
[W]hile some prostitutes may fit the description of persons who
freely choose (or at one time chose) to engage in the risky
economic activity of prostitution, many prostitutes have no
meaningful choice but to do so. Ms. Bedford herself stated that she
initially prostituted herself "to make enough money to at least feed
myself"... street prostitutes, with some exceptions, are a
particularly marginalized population… Whether because of
financial desperation, drug addictions, mental illness, or
compulsion from pimps, they often have little choice but to sell their
bodies for money. 300

In both PHS Community Services Society and Bedford the court rejected arguments
claiming that the causal connection between state action and harm was broken by
free will choices based on finding a lack of capacity to make alternative law-abiding
choices to protect themselves.301 In doing so the court appears to be equating a
“free choice” as synonymous with self determination that functions in service to ones
interests and well being. They view the behaviour of the claimants holistically and
recognize that while their decisions may be motivated to obtain a fix or money, these
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are self defeating, risky choices that would not be made if they had the capacity or
opportunity to make better choices.

In addition to being out of step with criminal law jurisprudence, the reasoning in PHS
Community Services and Bedford also conflicts with the earlier decision of HL which
dealt with the assessment of the pecuniary damages of a residential school
survivor.302 In that case the court awarded damages for lost earnings based on
finding the claimant’s sexual assault in a residential school caused his alcoholism,
which in turn prevented him from sustaining employment. 303 However, the Court
refused to award damages for time spent in prison because:
[T]he chain of causation linking HL's sexual abuse to his loss of
income while incarcerated was interrupted by his intervening
criminal conduct. During these periods, his lack of gainful
employment was caused by his imprisonment, not by his
alcoholism; and his imprisonment resulted from his criminal
conduct, not from his abuse by Mr Starr nor from the alcoholism
which it was found to have induced… 304

As Kent Roach points out, the decision is inconsistent in the manner the
causal chain between the sexual assault is said to be broken by the claimants
‘choice’ to commit a crime, but not with respect to his drinking or other
consequences attributed to his alcoholism such as unemployment. 305 The
court recognizes the manner the trauma of the sexual assault and
consequential alcoholism incapacitated the claimant from maintaining
employment but not from behaving in accordance with the law. No reasons,
302
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apart from citing the assumptions of retributive folk psychology, are provided
to explain the distinction.

These decisions demonstrate that retributive folk psychology does not provide a
description of human behaviour and choice that is sufficient to apply in different
cases and contexts. Cases like Ruzic and HL demonstrate that when retributive folk
psychology is applied to determine difficult cases, it does not explain but rather veils
reasons for the distinctions that drive the decisions. In contrast, cases like Bedford
and PHS account for context and demonstrate a willingness to incorporate
contemporary understandings of both internal and external causal constraints on
choice and behaviour in legal reasoning. PHS Community Services in particular
acknowledges both the connections between adverse developmental variables such
as childhood abuse, the development of addiction, and how it constrains behavioural
choices.306 The decision therefor demonstrates an understanding of behaviour that is
consistent with neuroscience.

ii) The Black Box of Suffering307
Inconsistency and lack of objectivity in the doctrine is not just an abstract legal
problem, but one that causes unjust suffering. As Sylvestre points out, the injustice of
the liberal individualistic model of choice described in retributive folk psychology has
the greatest impact on marginalized and vulnerable people who have the most
constraints on their capacity for choice.308 Decades of social science research has
306
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consistently evidenced that the people who are most often punished, are those who
have suffered the most disadvantage in their lives. A recently published metaanalysis indicates that over sixty-five percent of all inmates have suffered childhood
abuse. 309 Family violence, sexual abuse, parental addiction, and poverty are also
common reported experiences of Canadian inmates.310 Seventy percent of federal
inmates have less than a highschool education.311 Prior involvement in youth
corrections and the foster care system is also common amongst adult prisoners.312

Most prisoners also suffer from a diagnosed mental disorder.313 Seventy-six percent
of prisoners suffer from substance abuse disorder, while 86% of female and 60%
male prisoners have been diagnosed with either antisocial personality disorder
(ASPD) or borderline personality disorder (BPD). As discussed in chapter three, both
ASPD and BPD are associated with criminal conduct and involve behavioural
symptoms such as poor impulse control, emotional reactivity, violence, conflict with
309
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authority figures, and self harm.314 Development of these disorders are associated
with adverse childhood experiences and circumstances.315 These statistics are
consistent with what neuroscience tells us: that adverse developmental conditions
and experience cause neurological impairments which are linked to criminal
conduct.316 The same variables long linked with criminal behaviour in social science
research have also been linked with neurological differences or impairments and
common mental disorders diagnosed in offenders.317

Prison imposes more trauma and disadvantage on offenders. Evidence of inhumane
conditions and practices within Canadian prisons fills the reports of the Correctional
Investigator. 318 Dehumanizing conditions, concrete black bars, and barbed wire are
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ubiquitous in federal institutions and violence is a problem. 319 Access to education is
limited.320 A toxic workplace culture, staff misconduct, excessive force and
mistreatment of offenders routinely occurs in some institutions.321 Substandard
nutrition and unsafe food handling has been reported. 322 There is a mental health
crisis in prison, but there is little access to medical and psychiatric treatment
inside.323 Staff operating routinely respond to the behavioural mental health
symptoms of prisoners with force.324 Annual reports from the Correctional
Investigator have repeatedly noted problems such as excessive use of force,
avoidable deaths, in-accessible and problematic medical care, inadequate access to
rehabilitative opportunities, and overreliance on segregation. 325
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Suicide is a leading cause of prisoner deaths.326 Thirty-seven percent of all prisoner
suicides occur while in segregation also known as solitary confinement.327 There
were calls for reform of the use of segregation over thirty years ago following
Marlene Moore’s suicide.328 Still, the practice continued along with the suicides.329
After the details of Adam Capey’s four years in segregation came to light, the Ontario
Human Rights Commissioner ordered an end to the practice of segregation. 330 The
Ontario Superior Court found that the segregation had a profound impact on Capay’s
psychological integrity and violated his Charter rights.331 In response, the
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government introduced legislation that prohibits disciplinary segregation, but still
allows for isolation in “structured intervention units” as a safety measure.332

Retribution theory and its justifications of blame and punishment based on retributive
folk psychology take no account of the suffering that occurs in Canadian prisons.
Punishment theory has come under scholarly criticism for the manner in which it is
divorced from practical reality, ignores the subjective experience of punishment or
suffering, and has lost its legitimacy due to mass incarceration rates and
overrepresentation of minorities and mentally ill or disordered offenders in prisoner
populations.333 While retribution has been described as a moral theory of reciprocal
suffering, applying its principles in practice does not involve consideration of the
actual suffering a sentence will impose on an offender.334 Lisa Kerr explains how the
abstract nature of punishment theory enables it to ignore the suffering involved in a
prison sentence :

332

Bill C-83, An Act to Amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and another Act,
42nd Parl,1st Sess,C27 (as passed by the House of Commons March 18, 2019); and Corrections
and Conditional Release Act, supra note 32. Given the problems noted in Correctional
Investigator reports and how therapeutic units are substantively the same as segregations, supra
notes 318 and 319, the legislation and ending “disciplinary segregation” is unlikely to solve the
problem. Capay’s prolonged segregation was not disciplinary but justified on safety concerns,
supra note 331.
333

See for example: Marc O Degirolami, “Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir
James Fitzjames Stephens” (2012) 9 OHST JCL 699; Adam Kolber, “The Subjective Experience
of Punishment,” (2009), 109 Colum L Rev 182; and David Gray, “Punishment as Suffering” (2010)
63 VNLR 1619.
334

For Hegel, supra note 3 at 101, punishment when done right, must turn the criminals own will
back on itself stating “crime, as the product of a negative will, carries with it its own negation or
punishment.” Retribution is said to turn the crime back on itself and “criminal's own deed judges
itself.”
According to Kant, a choice to commit a wrong against another carries with it consent to
equivalent treatment stating that, “whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the
people, that you inflict upon yourself”. [Immanual Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, M Gregor
trans, New York: (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 141. See also: Paul Campos,
‘The Paradox of Punishment’,(1992) Wisc L Rev 1931 at 1933.]

!89

The prison is largely a black box in the fields of punishment and
sentencing theory. Functions are presumed, but the internal
workings are unknown. Theorists attempt to justify inputs into the
box, and they advance claims about whether its various putative
functions might be legitimate. They limit their attention to the
political conditions or moral claims that might justify the imposition
or announcement of a state sanction, but not its administration.
Theorists ask when the box can be used, on what grounds, and for
how long, but its inner workings and methods remain unexamined
and untheorized.335

This lack of account or concern for prison conditions and the subjective experience
of prisoners is not just a problem within legal theory, but one which challenges the
legitimacy of criminal justice within a constitutional democracy. As Kerr points out,
everything that occurs in prison will be subjectively experienced by the prisoner as
part of their punishment, including physical and sexual assault.336 Suffering should
therefore be treated as a proper concern for proportionality analysis, but in
sentencing determinations, length is the only factor routinely considered when prison
is ordered.337 Theorists and judges justify punishment on the basis of metaphysical
moral theories and abstract logic while ignoring factors that are relevant to how a
sentence will impact and be experienced by an offender.338

Kerr’s analysis further demonstrates the lack of objectivity in retributive folk
psychology and that principles derived from it function as a veil that forecloses
335

Kerr, supra note 307 at 86.

336

Ibid.

337

Ibid. See also: Lisa Kerr, “Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims
of Punishment” (2017) 32:2 Can J L & Soc'y 18. Ibid at page 199 Kerr notes that the dictum in R v
Smith [1987] 1 SCR 1045 is never applied. Ibid at para 57 states: "effect of the sentence is often
a composite of many factors"; that it is "not limited to the quantum or duration of the sentence...
but includes its nature and the conditions under which it is applied".
338

See also: Benjamin L Berger, “Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope,” (2015) 17:11
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper, online: Osgoode Law School, <https://digitalcommons.
osgoode. yorku.ca /cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1097&context=olsrps>.

!90

inquiry and discourse into the legitimacy of the practices it purports to justify.
Correctional practices are assumed just and not subjected to discourse in
jurisprudence. The justificatory conclusions drawn from retributive folk psychology
ward off examination of normative debate regarding the trauma and disadvantage
offenders have suffered and how it is causally related to their criminal conduct as
well as the additional indignities they will suffer as part of their punishment. They
also mute discourse regarding legal norms that function in practice to impose
suffering on vulnerable and marginalized people for disordered behaviour caused by
factors outside of their control and whether they are truly just when measured
against the overarching Charter value of human dignity.

iii) Violating Values
Canada’s official position is that “it is committed to achieving reconciliation with
Indigenous peoples” and has stated the following in a 2018 publication:
The Government recognizes that Indigenous self-government and
laws are critical to Canada’s future, and that Indigenous
perspectives and rights must be incorporated in all aspects of this
relationship. In doing so, we will continue the process of
decolonization and hasten the end of its legacy wherever it
remains in our laws and policies.339

Presently, the legacy of colonial policies continues in criminal law.340 Indigneous
persons make up approximately 3% of the Canadian population, but represent 33%
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percent of Canada’s prisoner population.341 As the Correctional Investigator notes, it
reported that efforts to remediate overrepresentation were not working in 2016 when
indigenous persons represented twenty-five percentage tof the prison population.342

Overrepresentation has actually been a target of reform for over thirty years. 343 Bill
C-41 introduced the requirement to consider alternatives to imprisonment “with
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” in subsection 718.2
(e) of the Code. Falling short of holding that the provision created a presumption in
favour of alternatives, the Supreme Court in Gladue held that systemic and
background factors must be considered when sentencing Indigenous offenders.
These include, “low incomes, high unemployment, lack of opportunities and options,
lack or irrelevance of education, substance abuse, loneliness, and community
fragmentation”.344 If systemic and background factors have played a significant role
in their life, the sentencing judge must then consider the availability of appropriate
alternatives such as restorative justice processes. 345 In Wells, it was held that pre-
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sentencing reports detailing background and systemic factors must be considered in
all cases involving indigenous offenders, even those involving serious crimes. 346

Numerous problems have been noted regarding the application of Gladue which
might partially explain its lack of real impact on incarceration rates.347 However,
resolving noted problems of systemic bias, barriers to access, and disparities in the
application of Gladue would not remove judicial discretion to order incarceration.348
Kent Roach notes that courts are reluctant to order non-custodial sentences or
reduce prison sentences in serious cases, even when systemic factors are
identified.349 In the exceptional serious cases where Indigenous offenders received
community sentences, the offenders came from traditional backgrounds and were
able to demonstrate community support.350

The maintenance of retributive folk psychology should also be considered a major
factor contributing to overrepresentation and ongoing oppression of Indigenous
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persons in the manner it justifies the infliction of additional trauma through
punishment. The case of Ipeelee involved two Indigenous repeat sex offenders who
had violated the terms of their long-term supervision orders.351 The histories of Mr.
Ipeelee and Mr. Ladue exemplify the causal link between the governments colonial
policies, adverse childhood experiences in traumatized communities, the
development of addictions and mental disorders, and how prisons exasperate rather
than rehabilitate their behavioural symptoms. Both offenders were sexually abused,
had substance abuse disorders, and had been diagnosed with Antisocial Personality
Disorder.352 Mr. Ladue was sexually abused in residential school and began using
narcotics while in federal prison.353 Applying Gladue, the court held that these factors
reduced their moral culpability and reduced their prison sentences but maintained
that the offenders still acted with moral voluntariness and were therefore still
blameworthy:
Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social
and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited
options for positive development. While this rarely - if ever - attains
a level where one could properly say that their actions were not
voluntary and therefore not deserving of criminal sanction, the
reality is that their constrained circumstances may diminish their
moral culpability.354

Because of the assumptions of retributive folk psychology, the court does not have to
identify or explain at what point or in what way the offenders in Ipeelee could have
transcended the conditioning of their oppressed lived experience and harness
rationality to override the limitations of their capacity developed in response to the
351
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trauma and social disadvantages imposed on them by government policies. It is
simply assumed that they could have and should have.

Neuroscience explains that Mr. Ipeelee’s and Mr. Gladue’s capacities have not only
been shaped by the trauma they experienced in their lives but are also a product of
genetic inheritance. Their parents were alcoholics as well. The ongoing punishment
of indigenous persons in prisons cannot even be described as an effect of
colonization, it is a consequence of presently operative legal norms that will impact
future Indigenous generations. Retributive folk psychology and the punishment
practices it justifies are therefore a glaringly obvious example of “operating practices
and processes” that continue to oppress Indigenous people of Canada.355 As Malini
Vijaykumar explains:
The history of systemic discrimination against Indigenous peoples
in Canada begins with the first experiences of colonialism and
genocide, extends through the outlawing of cultural practices such
as the Potlatch and Sundance and the corresponding cultural
genocide perpetrated through residential schools and policies such
as the Sixties Scoop, and continues in present-day Canada in
various interrelated forms. One of its present-day manifestations
lies in the Canadian criminal justice system's treatment of
Indigenous peoples.356

Another example of how retributive folk psychology conflicts with Canadian values is
how other marginalized and vulnerable people are disproportionately punished and
imprisoned. Justice Abella, citing Habermas, states in the case of Loyola High
School v Quebec:
These shared values - equality, human rights and democracy - are
values the state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and
protecting. They enhance the conditions for integration and points
355
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of civic solidarity by helping connect us despite our differences:...
This is what makes pluralism work. 357

As Justice Dickson explains in Big M Drug Mart Ltd, human dignity, not folk
psychology, is the foundation basis of the constitutional protection of liberty and
autonomy:
"What unites enunciated freedoms… is the notion of the centrality of
individual conscience and the inappropriateness of governmental
intervention to compel or to constrain its manifestation.... It is easy to
see the relationship between respect for individual conscience and
the valuation of human dignity that motivates such unremitting
protection.” 358

Legal protection of dignity thus requires more than the freedom to choose. It requires
the law to respect "identity, self-worth and emotional well-being"359 and “physical and
psychological integrity".360 However, as the reports of the Correctional Investigator
have noted, the human right to dignity is routinely and systemically violated within
Canadian prisons in multiple ways.361
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Charter values must not only inform the interpretation of rights and freedoms,362 but
also the interpretation of statutes and every exercise of statutory discretion.363
However systematic violation of human rights and undignified suffering continues in
Canadian prisons as a function of established policies and practices under the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act.364 In her presentation to the Senate
standing committee Chief Commissioner of the Canada Human Rights Commission
Marie-Claude Landry notes:
[C]onditions that exist outside of prison, in society at large, continue
to have an acute impact within prison walls. We are talking about:
Systemic racism, discrimination and biases, historical abuse,
profound poverty and food insecurity, insufficient access to health
care, and inadequate supports in mental health services […] too
little is being done for the vulnerable groups that are most affected
by our collective failure in addressing those issues…. 365

Retributive folk psychology leads us to the conclusion that those who commit a crime
deserve to suffer punishment, no matter how vulnerable and marginalized they are in
society, or how much government policy has impacted their developed behavioural
capacity. Legal norms characterizing crime as an individual moral failure conflict both
in principle and practice with the acknowledgment of inequality and disadvantage in
society. They justify the systemic violation of dignity through punishment practices
that impose trauma and suffering on indigenous persons and other marginalized
groups. Accordingly, the maintenance of retributive folk psychology in criminal law
362
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norms frustrates the realization of Charter values such as dignity and equality as well
as Canada’s commitment to human rights and reconciliation with Indigenous people.

Neuroscience on the other hand is inconsistent with understanding crime as an
individual moral failure. It establishes that our rationality does not function
independently from our unconscious limbic system, or enable so-called “moral
control” that overrides our developed capacity for behaviour.366 It provides a
description that helps us understand how disadvantage impacts capacity for choice
and behaviour, and that many actors and institutions play a causal role in criminal
behaviour. Neuroscience demonstrates offenders are not individually responsible for
their conduct because their behavioural capacity is shaped by factors outside their
control. It is therefore incompatible with the conclusion that imposing suffering or
punishing offenders is a just way to respond to crime. Accordingly, if criminal law was
to adopt an understanding of human behaviour consistent with neuroscience, it
would necessitate the abolishment of punishment and wide sweeping reforms to
sentencing practices. In adopting norms and practices that better respect the dignity
of offenders, the criminal justice system would be brought into harmony with
fundamental values overarching the legal system.
iv) Systemic Failure
As discussed in chapter two, Bill C-41 and the sentencing reform processes that
preceded it were aimed at ameliorating long standing problems of over incarceration,
high recidivism, and indigenous overrepresentation. The amendments failed to
achieve any progress towards these goals. As discussed, Indigenous overrepresentation has grown worse. Incarceration rates have also not decreased, and
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remain high compared to most western European countries.367 Despite a reduction
in the crime rate since the enactment of Bill C-41, the prison population has
increased.368

The maintenance of retributive folk psychology and its justifications of punishment
practices function to perpetuate the problems targeted by the reforms. It also
frustrates the overarching purpose of criminal sentencing. Section 718 states that
“The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society”, maintain respect for
the law and a “just, peaceful and safe society.”369 However punishment practices do
not serve this purpose and function to cause more crime.

Deterrence theory presumes that people will choose not to commit crime to avoid
punishment. 370 Neuroscience explains that adverse developmental conditions and
experiences impair the capacity to make behavioural choices that are in an
individual’s best interests, or consistent with their consciously held intentions.371 The

367

See: Cheryl M Webster & Anthony N Doob, “Missed Opportunities: A Postmortem on
Canada’s Experience with the Conditional Sentence”, (2019) 82 Law and Contemporary
Problems, 163; Andrew A Reid & Julian V Roberts, “Revisiting the Conditional Sentence of
Imprisonment after 20 Years: Is Community Custody Now an Endangered Species?” 24 Can Crim
L Rev 1; Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Police-Reported Crime Statistics in
Canada, 2018, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2018), online: Statistics Canada, <https://
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/ 00013-eng.htm>; and Canada, Public
Works and Government Services, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview,
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2018), online: Public Safety Canada,
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ccrso-2018/index-en.aspx>.
368

Webster & Doob at 164; and Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Ibid.

369

Supra note 29.

370

See for example: Irving Piliavin et al, “Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice” (1986) 51:1
Am Soc Rev 101.
371

Caruso, supra note 168. See also Sarah Gregory et al, “Punishment and Psychopathy: A
Case-control Functional MRI Investigation of Reinforcement Learning in Violent Antisocial
Personality Disordered Men,” (2015) 2:2 The Lancet Psychiatry 153.

!99

high prevalence of determinant variables such as childhood poverty and abuse
amongst prisoners is wholly consistent with the high prevalence impulse control
disorders such as ASPD and BPD in the prison population.372 As Caruso points out,
punishment or negative reinforcement does not work for individuals suffering from
common disorders in offenders such as ASPD and BPD and can exacerbate
symptoms. 373 As discussed, offenders with these disorders are not provided with
access to treatment and encounter conditions within prisons that intensify the
behavioural symptoms of their disorders.

Research on deterrent effects is consistent with these conclusions. Certainty of
sanction demonstrates a general deterrent effect across the population, but harsher
punishment does not increase this effect. 374 Research also indicates that some
people, such as those with histories and traits common in the prison population, are
not deterred by punishment. When the general deterrent effect is broken down,
effects vary widely depending on characteristics such as social bonding, impulsivity,
socioeconomic status and position in a social network.375 Furthermore, prison has a
criminogenic rather than deterrent effect. 376 Offenders who have served harsher
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sentences compared to controls have higher rates of recidivism.377 Even when
variables such as the type of offence are controlled for, community sanctions have
been demonstrated to produce lower rates of recidivism than imprisonment.378

v) Better Performing Alternatives
The negative effects of retributive punishment cannot be defended as unavoidable.
Perhaps the most successful feature of Bill C-45’s sentencing reforms was the
authorization of “alternative measures” such as restorative justice.379 This reform
enabled the development and integration of alternative sentencing processes within
the Canadian criminal justice system.380 These alternative sentencing processes,
377
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which do not seek to blame and punish offenders for moral blame, produce better
outcomes than retributive sentencing.

Restorative justice pursues the overarching goal of “restoration” in sentencing, which
will be discussed further in the next chapter. All available data indicates that
restorative justice participants have lower rates of recidivism as well as greater
victim satisfaction and restitution compliance than those who are sentenced in
traditional retributive sentencing processes.381

Similarly, Drug Courts, Mental Health Courts, First Nation courts, and Domestic
Violence Courts, forgo moral blame and punishment and pragmatically seek to
resolve the underlying issues giving rise to the criminal conduct.382 They have been
described as functioning within a “therapeutic justice” model.383 Most are predicated
on offering sentence reduction or potentially a stay of proceedings if the
programming is successfully completed, and, accordingly, many individuals charged
with serious offences are ineligible.384 While these programs are relatively new in
Canada, other jurisdictions with similar programs have demonstrated reduced
381
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recidivism rates.385 While the quality of these studies vary and different programs
diverge in design, quality and outcomes, 386 evaluative data on Canadian drug and
mental health courts also demonstrates lower, and in some cases negligible, rates of
recidivism.387

Alternatives to traditional prisons that have been created in response to Indigenous
overrepresentation offer another comparator demonstrating that non-retributive
practices, that impose less suffering and offer capacity building opportunities, work
better. Pursuant to the Aboriginal Justice Strategy (AJS), Indigenous community
based justice programs, custodial “Pathways Healing Units”, and “Aboriginal Healing
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Lodges” have been created.388 Evaluative data indicates that AJS program
participants are significantly less likely to reoffend than non-participant controls.389
Custodial programs providing elder support resources and programming, “Pathways
Healing Units” within institutes, as well as separate medium security institutions
called “Aboriginal Healing Lodges”, also appear to produce better outcomes.
Participants in all of these programs also have significantly lower rates of recidivism
than those who are punished in the traditional system.390

These alternative practices do not treat crime as an individual moral failure, but
indicative of either a social problem, or symptomatic of deeper underlying internal
constraints that the individual requires assistance to address. They are therefore
consistent with neuroscience which also identifies the social environment, and
388

The AJS cannot be described as an overall success. The growth of its programming over 25
years and has been slow and access is poor and uneven across jurisdictions. See: Canada,
Department of Justice, Evaluation of the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, (Ottawa: Evaluation Division
Corporate ServicesBranch, 2016), online: Department of Justice, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/cp-pm /eval/rep-rap/2016/ajs-sja/index.html>, at appendix C.
Deficiencies in its programs have been noted as well. Problems include lack of sufficient funding
as well as autonomy or self governance and failure to properly account for colonialism and
integrate significant cultural principles, such as interconnectedness, which recognize that harm
never arises or exists within one individual and calls for fulsome considerations and response to
multiple variables. See for example: Jane McMillan, “Still Seeking Justice: The Marshall Inquiry
Narratives”, 47 UBC L Rev 927; Chris Cuneen, “Reparations and Restorative Justice:
Responding to the Gross Violation of Human Rights” in Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds,
Restorative Justice and Civil Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and
Naomi Giff, The Aboriginal Justice Strategy: Trends in Program Organization and Activity,
(Ottawa: Aboriginal Justice Directorate, Department of Justice Canada, 2000), online: <http://
www.justice.gov.yk.ca/fr/pdf/02-1_History.pdf>.
389

Ibid, Evaluation of the Aboriginal Justice Strategy at appendix C.

390

Canada, Public Safety,Research Summary: A Meta-analysis of the Effectiveness of CulturallyRelevant Treatment for Indigenous Offenders, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2017) online:
Public Safety Canada, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2017-s016/indexen.aspx>; Canada, Correctional Services, Final Report - Effective Corrections Initiative Aboriginal Reintegration, (Ottawa: Correctional Services Canada, June, 2004, online:
Correctional Services Canada, <https:// www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pa/ev-eci-ar-394-2-32/
ECIAboriginalReintegration-eng.shtml>; and Shelley Trevethan et al, An Examination of Healing
Lodges for Federal Offenders in Canada, (Ottawa: Research Branch Correctional Service
Canada, November, 2002), online: Correctional Services Canada, <https:// www.csc-scc.gc.ca/
research/r130-eng.shtml> at 33.

!104

neurological capacity developed in response to it, as the underlying causes of
criminal conduct.

vi) Retributive Folk Psychology is Wrong
Pragmatic review of how retributive folk psychology functions in practice leads to the
conclusion that it is wrong. Not because it conflicts with neuroscience per se, but
because it consistently produces negative consequences in several regards. The
‘good’ that retribution theory claims to achieve through the moral alchemy of
punishment exists only in theoretical abstractions and cannot be observed when the
consequences of its practices are examined. Adherence to retributive folk
psychology and the normative veil provided by its metaphysical principles also
prevent the law from acknowledging contextual factors relevant to the law and
evolving in a way that is responsive to contemporary understanding and resolves
longstanding problems. Rather, retributive norms function to perpetuate these
problems. As Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill state:
[L]aw is replete with discussion about volition, intent, and
rationality. But by defining these terms without any information
about how the brain actually works,... and instead relying on
paradigms of human behaviour that bear little resemblance to
reality, the courts have created one of the highest rates of
imprisonment on earth. 391

Furthermore, retributive folk psychology conflicts with how a legal system is intended
to function in liberal democratic societies. As Sylvestre and Berger point out, the
legal doctrine and principles derived from retributive folk psychology are overly
abstract, idiomatic, lack objectivity and are applied in a way that forecloses
consideration of relevant causal factors and veils the basis upon which decisions are
391
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made.392 Just as neuroscience would predict, prison populations are largely
constituted by those who suffer adverse developmental conditions that are linked to
impulse control mental disorders. Indigenous persons who are the inheritors of the
intergenerational trauma perpetrated on them by the government are grossly
overrepresented in prison. In prison, offenders are robbed of dignity as institutional
conditions and practices impose more trauma and suffering on them. As Kerr’s
critique highlights, proportionality assessments do not inquire into the actual
suffering and consequences that will result from a sentence.393 The veil of
justification provided by retributive folk psychology enables criminal justice practices
to function outside the discourse of the law in a way that conflicts with Canadian
values such as dignity and equality as well as its commitment to human rights and
reconciliation with Indigenous people.

The law should seek to evolve its norms guided in part by neuroscience, not just
because of its empirical validity, but because the understanding of human behaviour
it offers can support the development of better criminal justice practices. Alternative
sentencing practices that operate to address underlying causes of behaviour rather
than punish moral blame produce better results than retributive practices. Custodial
institutions that seek to heal rather than impose suffering also produce better
outcomes. Neuroscience offers an empirical explanation of why these programs
work. Offenders in these programs do not experience the same amount of trauma
and suffering and are provided with more opportunities that support the development
of a more functional behavioural capacity. Accordingly, they are more likely to be
made more capable of complying with the law as a consequence of their sentence.
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Of course, not all offenders share the common characteristics or life histories that
are highly prevalent in Canadian prisons. Some do appear to choose crime in a
conscious, rational way. For example, white collar criminals are motivated by
tangible gain or profit and can pursue these goals in calculated and skillful manner.
However, neuroscience demonstrates that all behaviour is a function of capacity, and
rationality does not override capacity. Rather, the intentions we form and the
reasoning involved in forming it, is a function of capacity that is conditioned in
response to the social environment. White collar criminals are often already wealthy.
Thus, their risk to obtain more or their lack of concern for the suffering and
deprivation their crimes impose on others can be seen as pathological.394 Gambling
addiction is also common among convicted white collar criminals.395 These offenders
are not sympathetic, but our feelings about it do not make the general observations
of neuroscience any less relevant to understanding their criminal behaviour.

The sorts of criminal justice responses that may be appropriately responsive to
different crimes and offenders will vary. Sanctions in response to violations of the law
can still be thought necessary to deter those who can be deterred and maintain the
behavioural guiding function of criminal law. However, these concerns do not justify
punishment practices that impose unnecessary suffering and deprivation on
offenders. A sanction is not the same thing as punishment, and measures taken to
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maintain order are not justified by retributive norms.396 Similarly, the necessity of
incapacitation to maintain public safety may also arise in exceptional cases, but
conditions of confinement can and should still be compatible with a respect for
human dignity and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.397
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CHAPTER VI
NEUROSCIENCE & NORMATIVE THEORY

When folk psychology and the metaphysical justifications of retributive moral theory
are discarded, we must then ask how can we rethink criminal justice? This chapter
explores that question. It also responds to the argument that retributive folk
psychology is necessary to protect autonomy and justify individual rights.398
Alternative legal and political theories that are compatible with neuroscience will be
discussed to demonstrate that we can understand criminal justice and concepts like
responsibility and autonomy in a way that informs the construction of individual rights
that would respect dignity and autonomy more than retributive norms.

The review of alternative theories in this chapter is far from exhaustive. Theorists
have been criticizing and rethinking personhood for decades.399 Furthermore, they
map on to but do not justify rights that protect the dignity and autonomy of offenders.
In western cultures, the law has developed to acknowledge and protect human rights
in a manner that does not need justification. Canadian and international law already
protect self determination and dignity without justification denied from any universal
facet of human nature. As Rorty suggests, it might be better to “set aside Kant’s
question “[w]hat is man?’” and in substitute ask “[w]hat sort of world can we prepare
for our great grandchildren?”.400 In the pragmatist spirit, the theories discussed here
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are put forward as “suggestions about what we should try” with respect to our
thinking about criminal justice.

i) Shared Responsibility
Morse claims that neuro-reformers describe a society in which “no one is
responsible”.401 Another way to look at it is: everyone is responsible, not just for
ourselves, but also for each other. Sapulsky’s holistic synthesis of neuroscience
describes how criminal conduct is the result of neurological development in the
social environment. The choices of others impact our behavioural capacity. Our
actions, in turn, impact the capacity of others. The state and its actors through social
policy and its institutions shape the social environment and with it the neurological
capacity of us all. This can be obvious and profoundly oppressive as it is for
Indigenous persons in Canada. It can also be more subtle or difficult to notice. We
take for granted the received political economy and established health and education
systems, but as pragmatists point out, these are not a given. The choices and
conduct of the government and its actors have a hand in shaping the social
environment that impacts the development of all of its citizens in ways too myriad
and complex to even account for. Neuroscience demonstrates criminal conduct is
ultimately caused by many peoples choices. The most that can be said is that the
offender is the proximate cause of the crime.

Sylvestre argues that criminal law should acknowledge shared responsibility for
crime and characterize crime as a social conflict.402 She identifies four problematic
principles that lack empirical validity in the traditional liberal understanding of choice
in Canadian criminal law:
401
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First, individualism: there is a distinction and separation between
society and the individuals which make up society, who have
divergent and opposing interests. Second, rationality: humans are
rational beings who value reason at the expense of their emotions
or intuitions; they have all the information and skills required to
take the necessary measures to achieve their goals. Third, free
will: human beings live in a universe without constraints,and they
are free to make choices. Lastly, formal equality: human beings are
equal, have the same opportunities and must be held responsible
for their actions…403

She says that these assumptions should be set aside and that the normative
concepts of law should recognize that human beings are “profoundly unequal in
terms of power and opportunities,” and [a]lthough rational and capable of calculation
and strategy..[they are] also impulsive and emotional and do not always have the
information, intellectual capabilities and skills required to make their choices.”404
Sylvestre puts forward the model of choice in Pierre Bourdieu’s empirically validated
practice theory as a foundation for her arguments regarding both a shift towards the
recognition of shared responsibility and reforms to criminal legal theory, doctrine, and
practices.405

Practice theory accounts for three theoretical variables: habitus, the capital, and the
field.406 The field is the constructed and socially patterned space or context in which
choices are made and the capital accounts for the social assets deployable by an
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individual such as wealth, access to resources and social networks, knowledge, and
reputation.407 Sylvestre describes the habitus as “internalized second nature”
consisting of “predispositions that result from social conditioning” developed through
one’s “personal history and conditionings associated with objective socio-economic
conditions of existence.”408 Early experiences are “crucial in constructing the habitus”
for it functions to avoid change, preserve itself and selects for information that
reinforces it while filtering out or avoiding information and experiences that challenge
it.409 This is said to occur through non-exclusive mental processes in both the
conscious and unconscious minds of individuals.410

Sylvestre emphasizes that while the habitus functions in a manner that attempts to
reinforce itself, it is not fixed or predictable and thus transcends the constructed
dichotomy between determinism and free will.411 Practice theory, is therefore
consistent with the apparent dichotomy between quantum indeterminacy and
neuroscience. 412 There are also several parallels between the way neuroscience and
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practice theory describes behavioural choices. The habitus is described in a way that
corresponds to neurological capacity, and the field is like the social environment.
Like the habitus, neurological capacity limits the capital and social environments or
fields we have access to and the possible choices we are capable of making.

To harmonize with an empirical understanding of choice and recognition of shared
responsibility, Sylvestre advocates for a minimalist criminal justice system and the
creation of alternative responses to incidents of social conflict which are currently
dealt with in the criminal justice system. 413 Custodial detention should be almost
eliminated and only used when “necessary to detain an individual in order to protect
the victims and the public from a real and imminent threat” and “primarily as a safety
measure rather than an actual punishment imposed to inflict suffering per se”.414 The
goal of criminal justice sanctions and sentencing should be “preventing conflicts and
“helping to make communities safer” by transforming them.415 Criminal processes
should therefore operate from the normative perspective that:
[E]ach crime, conceived of as a conflict, must present an
opportunity for us, as as society, to reflect on the proportion of
responsibility that we should have to bear collectively for the crime
committed and on ways to prevent these conflicts and problematic
situations collectively.416
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To enable a shift towards the recognition of shared responsibility and a
transformative approach to criminal justice, Sylvestre also recommends
amendments to the criminal code that would direct liability assessments to seek a
fulsome understanding of a crime in its social context and identify the state’s share of
responsibility. Liability assessments would seek to determine degrees of shared or
contributory responsibility in a manner akin to tort law and allow for multiple verdict
options.417 She emphasizes that responsibility, not blame, should be the focus of
these assessments and that “punishment and sanctions should not only refrain from
being ‘cruel and unusual’ within the meaning of the Canadian Charter, but should
also respect the rights and dignity of individuals targeted by measures restricting
their freedom.”418

Despite these qualifiers, this suggestion from Sylvestre is still problematic. She has
said that “criminal law theory should recognize multiple degrees of responsibility ...
which in turn could allow for different kinds of verdicts: imputable, responsible, and
(in exceptional cases) blameworthy.”419 Although arguing that practice theory is an
appropriate foundation because it has been empirically validated, these distinctions
cannot be founded empirically or based on the pure concepts of Bourdieu’s model of
choice. Sylvestre’s concerns with the liberal retributive understanding of choice are
in its failure to recognize the constraints on choice that can be traced to social
disadvantage. Economic disadvantage and inequality can be observed, discussed,
and understood, but not all forms of developmental disadvantage causing antisocial,
unlawful behaviour can be. Sylvestre’s recommendation still assumes that some
exceptional criminals are individually responsible such that they cross an undefined
417
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threshold that renders them blameworthy. She thus recommends that liability
assessment purport to do what Sapolsky says neuroscience can’t do: identify
particular causal connections between experiences in the social environment and
particular behavioural incidents within individuals.

Attempting to apportion shared responsibility and distinguish between those who are
individually blameworthy and those who are not, would also result in the same sorts
of problems Sylvestre and Berger identify in current liability and defence doctrines.420
Because science does not provide an account for the myriad of causal factors in
individual behaviour, assessments and an adjudicator’s willingness or ability to
identify causal relationships indicative of shared responsibility will necessarily be
limited by their knowledge, understanding, and moral intuitions. The distinctions
made between crimes for which responsibility is shared and those blamed on
individuals would therefor remain veiled behind the norm of shared responsibility.
Like the doctrine of mens rea and moral involuntariness, shared responsibility would
be reduced to representation and function as a simulacra that obscures the basis
upon which judgements are made, in a manner incompatible with the institution of
law in a liberal democracy. Like the doctrine of mens rea and moral involuntariness,
shared responsibility would be reduced to representation and function as a simulacra
that obscures the basis upon which judgements are made, in a manner incompatible
with the institution of law in a liberal democracy.

Sylvestre says that transforming liability determinations into individualized
assessments is necessary to disrupt the individualized character of crime, but her
model still preserves this characterization for “exceptional” cases.421 Eliminating an
420
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individualized understanding of crime and incorporating an empirical understanding
of behaviour into criminal law necessitates discarding the notion that moral blame
can be determined through the application of objective legal norms at trial. Liability
assessments should instead focus solely on determining what the offender did or did
not do, and what thoughts or intentions they had in relation to the conduct to
determine whether the elements of an offence are established. Or in other words, the
question asked at trial should be whether the accused’s conduct and thought
processes were the proximate cause of the crime. Assessment of conduct without
moral judgement, would rid criminal legal doctrine of the incoherence and confusion
discussed in chapter five and all metaphysical assumptions about the nature of
choice. In this way, shared responsibility could function as an overarching norm that
serves to inform how criminal justice should be practiced, similar to how the
presumption of innocence has informed criminal procedure rules.

The essential elements of codified offences, absent retributive notions of blame, still

have a functional purpose in distinguishing between different offences in a manner
relevant to determining proportional responses from the criminal justice system.422
The mental elements defining criminal offences can be thought of solely as
distinctions which define and stratify the seriousness of crimes according to their
anti-social or harmful character, instead of degrees of ‘moral blameworthiness’ on
the part of offenders. Assessing the presence of mens rea elements, such as
intention or wilful blindness, would continue to function as they do now, but absent all
moral judgements. Instead of purporting to determine blameworthiness, liability
assessments would be understood as an objective examination of conduct and
422
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circumstances of the crime from which inferential conclusions are drawn about what
the offender was thinking. After the question of whether an offender committed a
crime is resolved, individualized processes that proceed on the recognition of shared
responsibility could determine the appropriate response based on the seriousness of
the crime, its full social context, and internal constraints on choice in the offender.

ii) Relational Autonomy
As discussed in chapter three, those critical of neuro-reformer arguments have also
emphasized the importance of retributive folk psychology by pointing out how the
traditional Kantian concept of autonomy has provided the normative foundation for
individual rights. Even if retributive folk psychology is abolished, the Canadian
criminal justice system must still respect the autonomy interest protected by section
7. However, accepting that rationality does not override our capacity would not
eliminate this protection, it simply necessitates redefining it in the criminal law
context.423 Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational theory offers an alternative normative
understanding of human nature and the law that informs a concept of autonomy
which can serve as a foundation for the construction of individual rights.424

Rejecting the traditional liberal description of individuals as isolated, autonomous,
rational decision makers, Nedelsky sees people are mutually enabling and both
autonomous and dependent. To better construct rights that structure legal relations
between individuals in a manner that recognizes this facet of experience, the content
423
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of rights must be understood in the contextual dynamics of relationships.425
Relational theory abandons traditional liberal individualism, but still holds
fundamental concern for many of the values that are often claimed to be protected
and served by its concepts. Jennifer Llewellyn explains:
From a relational starting point, these values [equal concern,
respect, and dignity] are not rooted in our rational nature as
autonomous agents, as they are for liberals, but rather in our
relational nature. They detail what we require from one another,
and in relation to one another, for our well being. Indeed, ... once
revised from a relational point of view, the very notions of equality,
autonomy, identity, and judgment require more than individual
rationality, and indeed destabilize rationality as the basis for
treatment of and by others.426

Nedelsky argues that shifting legal presumptions about ourselves and civic
interactions away from the folk psychology of rational individualism into a relational
perspective, would better serve values of equality, dignity, mutual concern and
respect.427 To replace the folk psychology of the free choosing rational individual,
relational theory puts forwards a concept of “self” that is formed in and through
relationships with others, and individually determined through the exercise of agency
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and choice.428 The way theorists have described the relational self is wholly
consistent with both neuroscience and a recognition of shared responsibility in
criminal law. It takes account of the manner our social environment shapes our
neurological capacity, through “multiple relationships with other individuals and
institutions - some of which can promote flourishing and some of which can
oppress”.429 It also recognizes, rather than ignore, the internal "forces that limit the
set of options and thereby interfere with choice."430 A relational concept of autonomy
accounts for the manner in which a persons capacity to identify and make particular
choices, can be “oppressively constructed through socialization in such a way that
the person does not accurately perceive herself or her options.”431

Relational analysis supports construction of novel conceptions and definition of legal
rights by providing a more accurate or comprehensive account of human nature than
traditional liberal norms. Bruce Archibald explains:
Relational rights theories in the public law context have emerged in
some measure from the common sense empirical proposition that
all of us are literally the product of relationships, and live in and
through the totality of our relations with others. This important
insight is often lost in the rhetoric of neo/liberal political theory
which would have us believe that we are all simply individual
rights-bearers exercising ir/rational choices in the various arenas to
which our daily life takes us. But we exercise our personal
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autonomy in the context of relationships which enhance, limit,
condition and structure the choices we have available to us. 432

A relational description of self thus encompasses contemporary understandings of
behaviour and how our capacity to make choices is oppressed or supported through
socialization. It therefore provides a better foundation for constructing rights and
corresponding practices that better correspond to our experiences serve the values
underlying the Charter.433 With respect to relational autonomy, Downie & Llewellyn
put forward the following definition:
Autonomy is the capacity for defining, questioning, revising,
pursuing one's interests and goals that is exercised, protected, and
corroded within relationships and social structures which together
shape the individual and determine others' responses to her.434

Defining autonomy in these terms, is consistent with what neuroscience
demonstrates: that our capacity for making choices is shaped by the choices of
others. Unlike traditional liberal autonomy, a relational understanding does not
assume that rational thought can override the impact others have had on our
capacity for self determination. This acknowledgement within relational theory, gives
rise to the conclusion that criminal justice practices will have an impact on the
autonomy of an individual long after a process or sentence ends. It provides a basis
for recognizing that interference with psychological integrity not only engages the
security of person interest, but through the lasting impact the interference can have
on autonomy, liberty and the right to self determine is also engaged.
432
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A relational concept of autonomy also provides a framework for understanding how
power imbalances within relationships impact self determination. Pointing to the
inherent power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship, Downie and Llewellyn
explain how a relational understanding of autonomy necessitates placing legal duties
on the doctor to enable patients to make meaningful, informed choices about
treatment.435 The patient is dependent on the doctor to provide information she
needed to understand the consequences of choosing different options with respect
to her self determined best interests and therefor provide meaningful consent to
treatment. Accordingly the doctor has a legal duty to communicate this information to
the patient. The law of informed consent cannot be derived from liberal individualistic
concept of autonomy, but does accord with a relational understanding of it.436

There is an enormous power imbalance within the relationship between the
government and the individual.437 Criminal law recognizes this in the procedural
protections provided by the Charter before and during trial.438 However, once found
blameworthy things change. The liberal individualistic concept of autonomy that is
operative in legal norms does not recognize how experiences impact our capacity to
make choices in the future in ways that can’t be overridden by rationality. As
neuroscience demonstrates stress and trauma has a negative impact on
neurological capacity. As they are now, criminal justice practices are likely to have an
oppressive impact on the autonomy of offenders long after a sentence has ended.
435
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However, as discussed in chapter five, there is no meaningful consideration in
sentencing determinations with respect the suffering and consequential impact it will
cause.439 The law normatively ignores the interference state punishment will have on
offender’s capacity for future self-determination.

In contrast, adopting a relational understanding of autonomy, that is compatible with
neuroscience, supports the construction of constitutional rights that protect an
individual’s future capacity to self determine in a way that recognizes its inherent
vulnerability. It also reveals the invalidity retributivist claim that punishment respects
the choices of offender. Because of the deficiencies of its normative concepts,
retribution fails to adequately protect choices in its failure to even take into account
of how punishment will impact autonomy and self determination beyond the duration
of a sentence.440 A relational concept of autonomy can therefor provide more
protection and respect for choices than traditional Kantian concepts.

iii) Dignity
Morse’s concern that neuroscience describes humans as automatons, and provides
no basis for individual rights, also has no merit. Charter jurisprudence has
established that constitutional rights and freedoms not only respect for choices, but
other foundational shared values.441 Underlying the protection of liberty in section 7
of the Charter, is a concern and respect for human dignity.442 Human dignity, as a
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concept in constitutional law, is not restricted to Kantian philosophy which derives
inherent human worth from our rationality. 443 International human rights instruments
state that, “rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”444 Thus,
dignity provides both the underlying reason for the existence of Charter rights, and
operates as an aid to interpret their content and application.445

Moving away from retributive folk psychology would bring our criminal justice system
in harmony with the recognition that our right to dignity flows from our humanity, not
our rationality. Despite repeated concerns noted by the Correctional Investigator
regarding the routine indignities imposed on prisoners, the general conditions and
practices of contemporary correctional institutions have not been subjected to
constitutional scrutiny.446 The undignified suffering perpetrated by punishment
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practices remain veiled by retributive principles and norms.447 Prisoners do have
residual section 7 rights and violations have been found, but these are individual
exceptions.448 Punishment is currently considered lawful, so long as it does not
reach the threshold of cruel and unusual punishment. 449 However, if retributive folk
psychology was discarded, the systemic violation of human dignity in Canada’s
prisons would be subject to greater Charter scrutiny.

The concern voiced by Lemos, that rejecting the “belief in moral responsibility”
leaves no explanation for why criminal justice processes should only engage those
who have committed a crime, can also be dismissed.450 Respect for human dignity
and relational autonomy, provide an adequate normative basis upon which section 7
could be re-interpreted to preserve a presumption of non-criminality. A neuroscientific
understanding of human behaviour negates neither. These concepts still support the
traditional Kantian understanding that the right to self determination can be justifiably
limited to the extent it interferes with the rights of others. Recognition of the
vulnerability of our behavioural capacity within relational interactions, still
necessitates the construction and maintenance of legal norms and rules to govern
relationships, maintain a social order, and enable the pursuit of self determination
with dignity.
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Dignity is a broad and open concept in Canadian constitutional law. Jurisprudence
describes several facets of constitutional dignity.451 The decision in Law states that
dignity requires "personal autonomy and self-determination”, "physical and
psychological integrity and empowerment" and feelings of "self-respect and selfworth".452 Justice Dickson connected it to "identity, self-worth and emotional wellbeing".453 Examples of indignities acknowledged in cases have included
“subordination, servile submission or humiliation” and “state interference with an
individual's physical or psychological integrity, including any state action that causes
physical or serious psychological suffering”.454 These authoritative statements
suggest that constitutional protection of dignity is ultimately concerned with
preventing unnecessary emotional suffering and cruelty.

Rorty says the concern for dignity that has emerged in constitutional and
international human rights law is indicative of progress towards the root goal of the
liberal project: the reduction of human suffering, humiliation, and cruelty.455 This shift
in legal norms reflects a growing sense of human solidarity in western culture that
does away with the need for Kantian justifications. As Rorty describes it, solidarity is
an in-group feeling that does not extend to outsiders. It extends to those we feel are
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like us, those who are similar in terms of tribe, religion, race, customs and the like.456
We feel more revulsion in response to pain, suffering, indignity and humiliation in
those we feel more solidarity with.457 Neuroscience unfortunately confirms this ingroup bias.458 The implicit bias in the sympathy we feel towards others also explains
why we have tolerated the cruelty and suffering of punishment practices, despite
Canada’s explicit commitment to human rights. As Sylvestre argues, we can’t relate
to and are often revolted by the actions of offenders, who mostly consist of poor
people who live differently. Offenders and their behaviour are thus perceived as
monstrous.459

Recognizing this internalized unconscious bias should make us very suspicious of
retributive moral intuitions that give rise to belief that committing a crime renders one
deserving of undignified suffering. Canadian legal norms should be interpreted to
protect the dignity of all humans, including those who act in ways that we deem
seriously wrong. If human judgement of lawmakers and judges could be relied upon
to avoid human cruelty, human rights norms that constrain cruelty and suffering
would not have developed. These norms should function in a way that guides one to
reject justifications that purport to render infliction of undignified suffering under the
law, and set aside moral intuitions that affirm them.

Neuroscience not only provides empirical support to normative concepts that would
necessitate a greater protection of human dignity under the law, it promotes the sort
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of solidarity which is necessary to ensure it both politically and within the practice of
law. A neuroscientific understanding of behaviour gives rise to the conclusion that
offenders are also victims of their own impaired behavioural capacity. This
recognition may lead to a growing concern for the suffering and cruelty perpetrated
by punishment practices. Jennifer Chandler explains:
The prevailing beliefs about the causes of a person's behaviour or
condition affect feelings of social solidarity and willingness to help
and protect the person. In essence, we are more likely to accept
and protect people with disfavoured attributes and behaviours if
those characteristics are perceived to be outside their causal
control. As explained below, biological explanations of a
behavioural problem increase the perception that it falls outside a
person's control. In this way, biological psychiatry may affect
fundamental concepts in the area of human rights…460

In sum, if the law were to integrate a neuroscientific understanding of behaviour into
its norms, the law would have no justification for the intentional infliction of suffering
and require that criminal justice practices respect for the offenders right to dignity in
its responses to crime. A balance would have to be sought between legitimate
objects of criminal justice, such as maintaining the general deterrent effect of
prohibitions backed by consequential sanctions and the necessity to avoid inflicting
unnecessary suffering, and the necessary recognition that non-punitive interventions
that seek to supports rather than oppress the autonomy of offenders are also
necessary to prevent crime, maintain order and protect public safety.

iv) Restoration
As discussed in this chapter, adopting normative legal concepts that are consistent
with neuroscience necessitates a shift in the aims of criminal justice away from from
determining and punishing individual moral blame. Recognition of the state’s
responsibility also negates the conclusion that the burden of any criminal justice
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measure deployed in response to a crime should be borne by the offender alone. If
crime is understood as a lack of capacity to make choices in compliance with the
law, the obvious conclusion is that the criminal justice system must respond to crime
with measures intended to support its positive development.

Echoing Dewey, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen explain that the development
of human capabilities makes the realization of constitutional rights possible.461
Protecting individual choice is not enough to ensure substantive freedom of citizens.
Liberal democracies must provide the means through which it can be achieved.462
The proper objective of policy in liberal democracies, should be supporting the
development of capabilities by creating and maintaining real opportunities for
citizens to develop capabilities that enable the pursuit of fulfilment through self
determination.463 As discussed in chapter five, alternative sentencing interventions,
which seek to address underlying causes and build capacity in offenders, also result
in lower recidivism rates. Accordingly, normative legal concepts that harmonize with
neuroscience support an understanding of Charter rights that places duties on the
state to provide capacity building opportunities when imposing sanctions and other
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criminal justice measures on offenders.464 If the state is understood as sharing
responsibility for shaping the capacity of an individual who commits a crime, it should
also take responsibility by attempting to build their capacity to avoid crime in the
future. Restorative justice theory offers concepts that can assist in redefining criminal
justice norms in a manner that encompasses these concerns and harmonizes with
other normative concepts discussed in this chapter.

Restorative justice emerged as a seemingly new concept of justice in the late 70s.465
However, some of its advocates claim it was a prominent, or even the dominant
model of criminal justice across cultures throughout most of history.466 To support
this claim, Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong point to an “ancient pattern”
in Western law where offenders and their families “make amends to victims and their
families - not simply to compensate those injured but also to restore community
peace”.467 It has even been suggested that our innate intuitive sense of justice is
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restorative in nature.468 As Llewellyn & House explain, we feel “something must be
done” after a crime, but that something is not necessarily punishment.469

Relational theory is also harmonious with restorative justice theory. Unlike retribution,
restorative justice does not narrowly focus on the individual offender and their
conduct, but is “grounded in a commitment to understanding the fact of relationship
and connection as central to the work of justice”.470 A restorative approach,
therefore, rejects an individualistic concept of crime, proceeds from the
understanding that crime is a social problem, and accordingly seeks to accounts for
social context and individual internal constraints developed within it when
determining responsive measures.

Adopting a restorative approach to criminal justice is also not necessarily
incompatible with compelled processes, despite the primary manner it has so far
been integrated into the Canadian criminal justice system. Restorative justice has
often been defined in a manner synonymous with its associated practices and
procedures.471 Tony Marshall describes it as a process whereby all the parties with a
stake in a particular offence “come together to resolve collectively how to deal with
the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future”.472 This description is
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consistent with how restorative justice functions in the Canadian criminal justice
system as a consensual mediation based alternative sentencing process.473

A consensual process that begins with the offender accepting responsibility likely has
advantages in some cases, but this prerequisite is problematic in others. Some
offenders, particularly those with disorders such as ASPD and BPD, may have
difficulty with shame-based denial and a limited capacity to feel remorse.474
Furthermore, concepts developed in restorative justice theory are not necessarily
inconsistent with compelled processes to determine whether a crime has been
committed. The concept of ‘restoration’ offers a broad goal that could be applied to
guide processes that determine the appropriate response to a crime after a trial.475
The word restore implies a return to some prior state similar to restitution, but it
actually carries a different conceptual and functional meaning in restorative justice
theory.476 As Llewellyn and Howse explain:
Restorative justice, contrary to restitution, is not a slave to
rectifying a wrong by restoring the status quo ante. Instead,
restorative justice aims to restore the relationships between the
parties involved to an ideal state of social equality. It stands
juxtaposed to the backward focus of restitution as it attempts to
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address a wrong by transforming the relationship between those
involved such that the same situation could not arise again.477

Restorative justice, unlike traditional retributive and utilitarian punishment theories,
does not exclusively look backwards or forwards. In processes that seek restoration
as its goal, it is necessary to understand the crime in its social and relational context
to determine what measures would serves the goal of restoration in particular cases.
Restorative justice is thus pragmatic in the manner it examines real world effects and
experiences to determine what practice measures will function in service of realizing
ideal social relations that respect dignity and equality.

What is determined best to achieve restoration will vary from case to case. As
Llewellyn and House explain, imposing a sentence that requires an offender to pay
restitution may or may not be restorative, depending on whether or not it can be
reasonably seen as restoring an ideal state of relations. 478 A restitution order in some
cases may not actually meaningfully address unquantifiable harm experienced by
victims or could impose a burden on offenders that actually interferes with their
capacity to abstain from criminal conduct in the future.

The goal of restoration is compatible with the contemporary alternative criminal
justice practices discussed in chapter five, such as mental health courts and
Indigenous healing lodges. Mental health and drug courts function on the basis that
the underlying cause of the crime is not individual moral failure, but lack of capacity
that the offender alone cannot through rationality override. Neuroscience and
practice theory both indicate, that just as the criminal conduct has its genesis in
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relational interactions with others, development of a more functional behavioural
capacity must also come through experiences in the social environment. Consistent
with restoration and other alternative normative concepts discussed in this chapter,
these alternative processes implicitly acknowledge that supportive involvement of
others is necessary to build an offenders capacity to avoid crime.

Unlike punishment, mental health or drug treatment provide offenders with
supportive social relationships and environments focused on helping them develop a
more functional behavioural capacity. Accomplishing this which will not only better
enable offenders to avoid crime, but have positive interactions in their communities
and social relationships. In this way these criminal justice practice can be said to
function to in line with the goal of restoration. Similarly, enabling Indigenous
offenders to access healing modalities developed within their own cultures and elder
support also functions to transform capacities and the communities of offenders.
Understood this way, restorative justice as a model is broad enough to encompass
diverse criminal justice practices within its normative framework.

It is important to note that a respect for dignity and autonomy would guard against
overly intrusive measures such as imposing psychiatric treatments on offenders. It
would also be incompatible with a relational and restorative approach to criminal
justice which values equality within relationships. Within the doctor-patient
relationship, despite having more medical knowledge, the doctor is still prohibited
from choosing for the patient unless the patient lacks the capacity to understand
their options and foreseeable consequences. 479 Forced treatment, even if done with
the intention of helping someone, impacts the physical and psychological integrity of
an individual and therefor interferes with dignity and autonomy in ways that can have
479
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serious ongoing consequences. As Sapolsky acknowledges, neuroscience has not
developed to the point where we can reliably predict in individuals how particular
experiences or interventions will impact their behavioural capacity.480 It is well
established that stress and trauma has a negative impact, but the same surety
cannot be assumed regarding what will have a positive impact. These considerations
militate against the imposition of restorative measures that encroach into the
physical or psychological integrity of offenders, in ways that are inconsistent with
ideal social conditions that respect dignity and autonomy. However, whether or not
an offender chooses to access treatments may alter what the criminal justice system
deems necessary fro restoration. Broader purposes of criminal law, such as
maintaining public safety or maintaining predictable social order, can also be
understood as important features of ideal social conditions and therefor properly
relevant to restoration. Determining an appropriate response to crime thus will
necessarily involve a contextual analysis that takes account of, and seeks to
balance, various relevant factors and concerns relevant to the goal of restoration.

Furthermore, restorative justice assessments should not focus narrowly on the
offender in determining the appropriate response to a crime.481 Restoring ideal social
relations must take into consideration both the harm done to society and the victim
and how social conditions gave rise to the crime. A determination may identify how
state policy was materially responsible for a crime and therefor require that it rather
than the offender, pay restitution to the victim or otherwise takes responsibility for
addressing harm in ways that do not involve the offender’s participation.
Furthermore, the sort of reconciliation between victims and offenders commonly
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associated with restorative justice may be appropriate, but is not necessarily so. This
will depend on the particular context of each case.482 The goal of restoration seeks
an ideal state of social relationships “in which each person’s rights to equal dignity,
concern and respect are satisfied”.483 It therefore extends beyond the relationship
between the victim and offender. Llewellyn and House explain:
….while there is extensive literature about “healing” and so forth, the
end result to which the analysis is directed may be some form of inner
peace or acceptance that is not the same as the restoration of
relational equality in society. We have at a minimum to re-assess and
re-interpret evidence about “healing” or overcoming of victimization (or
guilt and shame in the case of wrongdoers) with an eye to the
restorative ideal itself. 484

Like any goal, restoration is aspirational and certainty it will be achieved is not
possible. It must be sought in a manner that harmoniously balances a respect for the
dignity and autonomy of offenders with the broader purposes of criminal justice
intended to serve the public interest. Nonetheless restoration offers a broad concept
that could replace retribution as the fundamental purpose of criminal justice that is
consistent with neuroscience.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUDING REMARKS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

[S]he has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she
currently uses because she has been impressed by other vocabularies,
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered
[… ] she realizes that arguments phrased in her present vocabulary can
neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; […] insofar as she
philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary
is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power, not
herself.
- Richard Rorty485

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that neuroscience, when assessed
pragmatically, has obvious relevance to criminal law theory and norms. As
discussed, retributive folk psychology assumes that rational thought processes
function to override impulses and control behaviour. This assumption directly
conflicts with what neuroscience has established concerning the enmeshment of the
dlPFC and the limbic system. Any law or policy that purports to guide human
behaviour, will fail to achieve its goals if constructed upon a faulty understanding of
it. This is evidenced in chapter five which reviews the problematic effects and poor
outcomes of punishment practices which derives justification from retributive folk
psychology.

Pragmatic analysis enables inquiry into the relevance of neuroscience to law beyond
the philosophical and metaphysical debates surrounding concepts of free will.
Regardless of the manner in which the libertarian concept of free will has been
ingrained in our law, when we set those unanswerable and irrelevant metaphysical
questions aside, a door opens for further inquiry and discourse. We are free to
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consider what has been established in neuroscience, and how that information might
inform the progressive development of legal norms and criminal justice practices.

Chapter six seeks to exemplify how a neuroscientific understanding of behaviour is
wholly compatible with the constructions of legal norms, and corresponding
individual rights that respect and protect dignity and autonomy. As discussed, these
norms are also better suited to support doctrine and practices that function
pragmatically to achieve the institutional purposes of criminal justice within a liberal
democratic society. As an institution, law is not as free as philosophy: it must remain
open to discursive re-definition of its concepts, but still needs explicit, objective
norms to fulfill its purpose and function in a liberal democracy.486 Striking this
balance is necessary for the law to provide stability and progressively evolve.487

Undoubtedly there are other ways to think about criminal justice without individual
blame and punishment, which are also compatible with both neuroscience and
jurisprudential statements discussed herein. The concepts and norms put forward in
chapter six should not be thought of as true in any absolute sense. The relational
‘self’ is a metaphysical concept. So is autonomy for that matter. In the future we will
observe more about ourselves and our world. Our needs, desires, goals and values
will evolve. Our activities will change as will the way we socially organize.
Neuroscientific knowledge will also grow along with our technological capacity to
observe. Like retributive folk psychology, concepts such as the ‘self’ and relational
autonomy may someday seem out of step with contemporary understandings, or
otherwise deficient to support functional practices that serve our values.
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This does not mean that neuroscience, or theoretical concepts compatible with it,
cannot be helpful now. As Rorty says, asking “which description tells us what the
situation really is”, does not help us as much as asking “which description of the
human situation are most useful for which human purposes”.488 Accordingly, those
who advocate for neuro-reform of criminal law, should avoid framing the relevance of
neuroscience in terms of the free will debate. Instead they should focus on what has
been established with respect to enmeshment of rational thought and unconscious
emotional processes, and how experiences in the social environment shapes and
constrains behavioural capacity in ways that cannot be overridden by rationality.
This knowledge has practical implications for understanding crime and how criminal
justice can most effectively respond to it. In contrast, hinging the relevance of
neuroscience to the philosophical question of free will obscures its practical
relevance, and prevents inquiry from moving past abstract issues.

This thesis also emphasizes the importance of understanding legal norms as
contingent means and rules for action, rather than a truthful description of reality as it
really is, independent from the human perspective. As discussed in chapters three
and four, neuroscience alone cannot provide answers to normative questions in law,
nor should it be looked to as providing law with absolute, fixed foundations.
Integrating neuroscience into legal understanding requires a reconstruction of
existing legal concepts such as responsibility and autonomy. When translated into
normative concepts in law, neuroscience offers a useful description of human
behaviour, that can support the pragmatic development of criminal justice norms and
practices that better fulfill its purposes in harmony with Charter values.
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Theoretical concepts such as shared responsibility, relational autonomy, and
restoration are normative, rather than empirical. To ensure their pragmatic function,
they cannot devolve into hollow principles that foreclose inquiry into relevant causal
factors, as retributive folk does now. Furthermore, to remain useful, the meaning of
legal norms cannot not be subsumed into institutional practices, as is the case now
with proportionality.489 Legal norms must be given objective meaning capable of
legitimization through discourse, but the validity of normative concepts in law must be

continually demonstrated by their function in practice.490

This thesis also argues against the common claim that retributive norms are
necessary to maintain protection of individual rights. Using Rorty’s language, the
recognition of the inherent worth and dignity of all human beings enshrined in the
Charter, needs no additional justification based on any “transcultural facts” about
human nature.491 For Rorty, the search for something about human nature to justify
individual rights, is like the search for absolute truth. It is beside the point. It is a
distraction that prevents us from talking about how to create a better world. As he
explains: “To abjure the notion of the ‘truly human’ is to abjure the attempt to divinize
the self as a replacement for a divinized world”.492
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Giving up on timeless, absolute foundations does not leave the law floating in a
relativistic sea of subjectivity. Chapter six exemplifies how legal and individual rights
can still be conceived in a contained manner by anchoring the inquiry to values that
overarch the legal system. Perhaps more than any other discipline, legal theorists
and judges must grapple with the tension between rationality and ignorance. They
must overcome ‘cartesian anxiety’ and abandon any pretence that our concepts in
law describe humans or the world as they really are from some omniscient vantage
point. In this obscurity, they must still arrive at conclusions about what is right. 493 If
jurists remain conscious of the limits of localized human perspective and still rise to
the challenge, they become what Rorty calls “ironists”.494

As the quote at the start of the chapter explains, legal ironists recognize the
contingency of their beliefs and maintain doubt about the principles they adopt. They
remain cognizant of the locality of the human perspective, and still persevere
knowing: justice cannot be discovered, but we can create a sense of it in the ideas
we form in response to experience. Legal ironists do not stand on their principles
and concepts, they hold them up for so long as they continue to serve the purposes
and fundamental values the law is bound to serve.

If jurists can become ironists, the discourse of law benefits for, “[w]hat takes the
place of the urge to represent reality accurately is the urge ….to be full participating
members of a free community of inquiry”.495 It also maintains focus on the
overarching task of the entire liberal project, the same goal animating Kant in his
493
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philosophical efforts: imagining and creating a social order in which human beings
flourish.496 Neuroscience now offers us more knowledge about what supports and
what oppresses human flourishing. It therefore should be taken up by legal theorists
and law reform advocates, not simply as empirical proof of their concepts, but as
informing their definitions as well. This reconstruction, would serve to build a
translatory bridge between the disparate epistemic cultures of science and law, and
enable the law to evolve as Holmes would have it: in responsive harmony with social
experience and the progress of science.497

Chapter six also demonstrates how neuroscience harmonizes with already existing
progressive normative theory that emphasizes a concern for human dignity and
equality. Neuroscience, therefore, offers a discursive tool to progressive theorists
and social justice advocates which not only offers empirical support for analysis and
argument, but also furthers their cause through the promotion of human solidarity. If
we take seriously what neuroscience tells us about the enmeshment of rational
thought and unconscious emotional responses of the limbic system, and take note of
the historical evolution of ideas about justice and its practices across cultures, the
conclusion emerges that theories of justice are contingent representations that
evolve with moral intuitions. Or in simpler terms, our feelings about what is right and
wrong change in response to social experience, and so goes the law. Accordingly, an
argument about what is just is unlikely to convince anyone who has not had the sort
of experiences necessary to share at least some of the author’s moral intuitions.498
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According to Rorty, the emphasis on rationality in Kantian liberalism provided a basis
of commonality for the development of norms that enabled a secular pluralistic
society that protected freedom of belief and the right to self determine.499 As is
demonstrated in Sylvester’s writings, we can now observe the inadequacy of Kantian
concepts and the oppression under the law they justify.500 Still, the law continues to
affirm the indignities routinely perpetrated against prisoners that have been well
documented repeatedly in yearly reports of the Correctional Investigator.501 The fact
that the cruelty and suffering of retributive criminal justice practices is tolerated,
suggests that Canadian solidarity has not yet extended to include criminal offenders.

“There is no neutral or non-circular way to defend” Rorty’s “liberal claim that cruelty
is the worst thing we can do”.502 Sensitization to the suffering of others, like any shift
in habitus, must come through experience.503 It was not the decades of critical theory
and academic writing describing it, nor mountains of statistics indicating its
existence, that provoked the recent cultural consolidation towards the recognition of
systemic racism in American police departments. 504 A shift in collective moral
intuitions occurred in response to a video showing a white police officer kneeling on
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a black mans neck for 8 minutes, choking him to death as distressed bystanders
pleaded with him to stop. This recent example of moral evolution is consistent with
Rorty’s view, that solidarity grows not through rational argumentation, but when
people come to realize that traditional tribal divisions “are unimportant when
compared to similarities with respect to pain and humiliation.” 505 Its growth is
evidenced when we come to feel repulsed in response to the cruel treatment and
suffering of others “wildly different from ourselves.”506

Weaving neuroscience into our narrative understanding of crime may help
encourage the sense of solidarity necessary to enable the abolishment of retributive
criminal justice. It provides a basis for understanding conduct and choices we
consider seriously wrong as stemming not from individual moral failure but a
manifestation of human vulnerability to the social conditions and experiences we
develop within. Mapping neuroscience on to existing moral intuitions can help
construct new narrative descriptions of crime that serve to sensitize others to the
suffering of offenders. For example, the infliction of deprivation and cruelty towards
children is universally revolting, but punishing adult survivors is not. Weaving
neuroscience into the life story of an offender enables an alternative narrative to
emerge in which the of neglect or abuse does not end with childhood, but
compounds itself overtime. This lens makes possible the observation that offenders
themselves are also victims of the crimes they commit.507
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To draw maximum support from neuroscience, scholars and advocates should
attempt to both translate it into normative legal concepts and talk about it in a way
that encourages the growth of solidarity and political consensus necessary for
progress in the law to occur. As Greene and Cohen argue, neuroscience will
inevitably influence the development of criminal law away from retributive folk
psychology as it seeps into public consciousness and transforms our moral intuitions
about crime.508 However, concern for the suffering of criminal offenders is much
more likely to grow if the relevance of neuroscience is not hinged upon its
implications for free will. Metaphysical questions about free will are meaningless in
our experience and not at all useful in confronting human challenges. Talking about
neuroscience in metaphysical abstract terms intellectualizes the issue and is thus
unlikely to strike a chord within moral intuitions.

In Behave, Sapulsky invokes the free will debate in his arguments for criminal justice
reform, but the shift to rational argument that occurs in this chapter stands in
contrast to the compelling, rich narrative synthesis that precedes it. The greatest
achievement of Behave is the manner Sapolsky makes neuroscientific descriptions
of behaviour seem both relevant and relatable by weaving it into familiar stories of
our lives. This is accomplished in a way that changes the meaning of these
narratives and challenges us to change the way we judge and respond to the
behaviour of other people. Accordingly, this thesis recommends that progressive
theorists and advocates for abolishment of retributive criminal justice draw on
neuroscience to construct new narratives that make neuroscience relevant in the
context of lived experience, to promote a more sympathetic understanding of
offenders and their inclusion in a Canadian sense of solidarity.
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Enabling one to acknowledge the cause and effect relationship between experiences
in the social environment and behaviour, without the filter of abstract concepts like
free will, helps enable us to recognize that offenders are not monsters, but are, as
Nietsche would say, “all too human”. 509 If we inherited their genes and lived the same
lives we would find ourselves behaving the same way. These conclusions need not,
and perhaps should not, rid us of the outrage we may feel in response to crime, nor
do they necessitate the conclusion that those feelings are meaningless. However,
they do demand that we refrain from channelling them through our criminal justice
system, in ways that impose the burden of responsibility for crime solely on
offenders.

The arousal of strong emotions amongst the public in response to a crime can also
still be taken as good reason to provoke a serious response from the justice system.
The criminal justice system can still denounce a crime without denouncing the
offender. The necessity to account for and seek a balance among various relevant
factors and objectives in determining appropriate criminal justice practices and
measures has been mentioned at various points, but left largely unexplored in this
thesis. Fleshing out the parameters and considerations of balanced assessments
based on legal norms reconstructed to harmonize with neuroscience, along with
envisioning the sorts of policies, practices and institutions that accord with them, is
an area ripe for future work.

In conclusion, this thesis serves as both a starting point and invitation to look beyond
concepts of free will to integrate neuroscientific knowledge into the normative
language of law. The reconstruction and development of legal norms that are
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compatible with neuroscience is a necessary first step in enabling the law to develop
in harmony with contemporary knowledge and understandings of human behaviour.
When neuroscience has been translated into concepts in law and legal theory, it can
then be used a discursive tool to hasten progressive reform of criminal justice
practices and ultimately reduce the cruelty, suffering and social problems they
currently perpetuate.
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